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AMERICAN EQUAL PROTECTION
AND GLOBAL CONVERGENCE
Holning Lau* & Hillary Li**
Commentators have noted that equal protection doctrine is in a state of
transformation. The nature of that transformation, however, is poorly
understood. This Article offers a clearer view of the change underway. This
Article is the first to reveal and synthesize three major trajectories along
which the U.S. Supreme Court has begun to move. First, the Court has begun
to blur the line that it previously drew between facial discrimination and
disparate impact. Second, the Court has begun to collapse its previously
established tiered standards for reviewing discrimination. These two
trajectories combine to produce a third trajectory of change: by blurring the
distinction between facial discrimination and disparate impact, and by
collapsing tiered review, the United States’ equal protection doctrine is
converging with equality jurisprudence from peer jurisdictions abroad.
After describing these changes, we argue that the collective wisdom of
foreign jurisdictions should serve as persuasive authority encouraging the
United States to continue along its current trajectories of doctrinal reform.
We contend that foreign jurisdictions have served as laboratories of doctrinal
innovation from which the United States could learn.
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INTRODUCTION
When the U.S. Supreme Court reverses course on constitutional doctrine,
it usually happens through evolution, not revolution. This was true, for
example, when the Court abandoned its previously vigorous protection of
freedom of contract during the so-called Lochner era.1 The Court departed
from precedent by moving slowly over a series of cases.2 Similarly, the
Court’s precedents condoning racial segregation had begun to fray long
before the Court explicitly rejected the doctrine of separate but equal.3 These
are just some examples demonstrating that constitutional law in the United
States changes through small steps, much like the common law.4
Because changes to constitutional law develop slowly over time, they can
be difficult to detect in real time. Indeed, three emerging trajectories in the
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence have received little scholarly
attention.5 This Article is the first to synthesize these developments and
discuss their theoretical and practical significance.

1. The most frequently discussed, and criticized, example of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
formerly strong protection of contractual freedom is Lochner. See Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 64–65 (1905) (invalidating a labor law that set maximum work hours for violating
freedom of contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). For background on the Court’s
gradual repudiation of the constitutional right to freedom of contract, see DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888–1986, at 210–14
(1990).
2. This departure began with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 538 (1934), which
upheld a law fixing the price of milk, and fully crystallized in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726, 732–33 (1963), which upheld a prohibition on the business of debt adjusting.
3. We borrow the imagery of precedents “fraying” from David A. Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 902 (1996). Before the Court explicitly
rejected racial segregation in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court
had issued many decisions that were inconsistent with the doctrine of separate but equal. See
generally McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337 (1938). For discussion on how these cases led up to Brown, see Louis Michael
Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 699–708 (1992).
4. For another example of how constitutional doctrine changes slowly like the common
law, see Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1461–72
(2000) (describing constitutional sex discrimination doctrine). For a foundational text on the
similarities between constitutional law and common law, see generally Strauss, supra note 3.
5. While some commentators have identified particular points along these emerging
trajectories, this Article presents a fuller view of them. For elaborations on relevant existing
scholarship, see infra notes 30, 34, 165 and accompanying text.
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The first two developments that we explore involve the Court distancing
itself from longstanding equal protection doctrine. First, the Court has
blurred the line that it once rigidly maintained between cases of facial
discrimination and disparate impact.6 Second, the Court has begun to
collapse its tiered framework for reviewing equal protection cases.7 These
two trends come together to form a third trajectory, which is the growing
convergence between American equal protection doctrine and equal
protection doctrine around the world.8 By blurring the distinction between
facial discrimination and disparate impact cases and by collapsing tiered
review in equal protection cases, the Supreme Court has aligned American
jurisprudence more closely with jurisprudence abroad.
These three emerging trajectories all carry great significance. Indeed, they
may become dispositive in Supreme Court decisions on cases currently
finding their way to the Court. The growing global convergence should also
prompt commentators to revisit heated debates about whether, and how, the
Court engages with foreign sources of law.9
Consider, first, the distinction between facial discrimination and disparate
impact. The Court has long drawn a line between laws that overtly
discriminate (facial discrimination cases) and facially neutral laws that
adversely affect particular groups of people (disparate impact cases).10 In its
equal protection jurisprudence, the Court has traditionally found facial
discrimination cases to be much more troubling.11 Recently, however, the
Supreme Court has begun to blur the line between facial discrimination and
disparate impact.12
6. Facial discrimination cases challenge laws that overtly discriminate against a group of
people, whereas disparate impact cases challenge laws that are technically neutral but
disproportionately affect a group of people in adverse ways. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 698, 740–51 (5th ed. 2015).
7. As a de jure matter, the Court has applied three tiers of scrutiny in equal protection
cases: rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. For background
reading on this tiered system, see id. at 699–702. Many commentators, however, contend that
the Court has developed additional de facto tiers of review. See infra Part I.B.
8. For background reading on comparative approaches to equality law, see generally
DAVID B. OPPENHEIMER, SHEILA R. FOSTER & SORA Y. HAN, COMPARATIVE EQUALITY AND
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES, CODES, CONSTITUTIONS, AND COMMENTARY (2012).
9. Emblematic of this debate is the disagreement between Justice Breyer and the late
Justice Antonin Scalia. Justice Scalia was a frequent and vocal opponent of citing foreign law.
In contrast, Justice Breyer has written extensive defenses of citing foreign laws and has
advocated that position during many public speaking engagements. See Robert Barnes,
Breyer: Fears of Foreign Law Don’t Resonate, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2015, at A3 (discussing
debate among Supreme Court Justices on the appropriateness of citing foreign law).
10. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), is a classic case in which the Court
distinguished facial discrimination and disparate impact; it concluded that cases of disparate
impact generally do not require vigorous scrutiny. Id. at 238–48.
11. See, e.g., id. at 238–48. This Article’s focus is constitutional law, not civil rights
statutes. In some statutory areas, the Court has been much more willing to find impermissible
discrimination based on disparate impact. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v.
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015) (discussing the Fair Housing Act);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428–29 (1971) (discussing Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also explicitly makes disparate impact
claims of employment discrimination colorable. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).
12. See infra Part I.
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Whether the Court continues down the path of conflating these two
categories of cases will influence pending litigation. Consider, for example,
the current case challenging North Carolina’s law that strips municipalities
of power to enact antidiscrimination ordinances.13 On its face, the statute
does not discriminate. In restricting local governments’ ability to enact
antidiscrimination ordinances, the law does not overtly categorize people for
Yet, this facially neutral ban on local
differential treatment.14
antidiscrimination ordinances uniquely impacts lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) communities.15 Unlike other groups that are protected
by federal civil rights laws—such as women and persons of color—LGBT
communities in North Carolina have had to rely on local ordinances in
progressive regions of the state for protection.16 Local governments are now
prohibited from passing any new antidiscrimination measures for at least
three years.17 Whether and how the Court distinguishes between facial
discrimination and disparate impact are questions that will influence
litigation challenging this restriction on antidiscrimination protections.
The litigation concerning North Carolina will also turn, in part, on the
standard of review adopted in the case.18 Traditionally, the Supreme Court
has applied three levels of review in equal protection cases: strict scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.19 Some scholars believe that
the Court has opaquely developed a fourth standard of review, often referred

13. In 2016, North Carolina enacted the Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act of 2016,
which is commonly referred to as House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”). See H.R. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb.,
2d Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016). In addition to requiring transgender people to use public restrooms
that comport with their assigned sex at birth, the law preempted local antidiscrimination
ordinances. Id. In 2017, North Carolina repealed H.B. 2 and replaced it with House Bill 142
(“H.B. 142”). H.R. 142, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017). H.B. 142 preempts any
local ordinance that regulates restroom access, including transgender people’s right of access.
Id. It also prohibits local governments from passing any other types of antidiscrimination
protections until December 1, 2020. Id. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and
Lambda Legal filed litigation challenging H.B. 2. See Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief para. 1, Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (No.
1:16-cv-00236), 2016 WL 1213004 para. 1. These organizations later filed an amended
complaint to challenge H.B. 142 as well. See Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint para. 1,
Carcaño v. McCrory, No. 1:16-cv-00236-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C. July 21, 2017). The U.S.
Department of Justice also challenged H.B. 2, but not the part of the law that preempted local
ordinances. See United States v. North Carolina, 192 F. Supp. 3d 620, 622–23 (M.D.N.C.
2016).
14. See H.R. 142; H.R. 2; see also infra Part III.C.
15. The North Carolina bills are distinguishable from the facially discriminatory Colorado
constitutional amendment that prohibited local governments from having antidiscrimination
laws that explicitly protect gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. See Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996).
16. See Jeff Tiberii, Sifting Through the Facts on House Bill 2, WUNC (Apr. 1, 2016),
http://wunc.org/post/sifting-through-facts-house-bill-2
[https://perma.cc/LP7U-FY8B]
(listing local antidiscrimination measures that existed prior to North Carolina’s moratorium
on such measures).
17. See supra note 13.
18. See supra note 13.
19. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 699–702.
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to by commentators as “rational basis review with bite.”20 Other scholars
interpret case law to contain even more de facto tiers.21 We contend,
however, that a better reading of recent cases is that the Court has
functionally eschewed its tiered framework and is converging upon a new
form of intermediate scrutiny that applies to all cases involving
discrimination based on personal characteristics.22 In gay rights cases, the
Court has ratcheted up rational basis review so that it functions more like
intermediate scrutiny.23 Meanwhile, in at least one recent race discrimination
case, the Court ratcheted down strict scrutiny so that it functions as strict
scrutiny in name only and as intermediate scrutiny in effect.24
To be clear, blurring of the distinction between facial discrimination and
disparate impact and the collapse of tiered review are still in the early stages.
Change is afoot.25 At this juncture, it is helpful to look abroad because many
20. E.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18–24 (1972); Jeremy B.
Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should
Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classes Based on Sexual Orientation,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2773–74 (2005) (arguing that while the Supreme Court has applied
rational basis with bite to sexual-orientation discrimination, it has not done so explicitly and
thus has left lower courts confused).
21. E.g., James E. Fleming, “There Is Only One Equal Protection Clause”: An
Appreciation of Justice Stevens’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301,
2304–10 (2006) (contending that there are at least six tiers); Maxwell L. Stearns, Obergefell,
Fisher, and the Inversion of Tiers, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2017) (identifying five
tiers).
22. As we explain in Part I.B, this Article focuses on cases involving discrimination based
on personal characteristics that are usually difficult to change, with race, sex, and sexualorientation discrimination serving as paradigmatic examples. We refrain from examining how
the Court will treat discrimination based on other characteristics, such as the differential
treatment of licensed optometrists and ophthalmologists versus unlicensed opticians. See
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 490–91 (1955). We limit our analysis to the
first category of cases because they have been the focus of the Court’s recent jurisprudence
and our aim is to examine the consequences of recent developments. We note that personal
traits might be difficult to change for a variety of reasons including biological constraints or
the fact that the change would require a large compromise to one’s sense of self. The Supreme
Court has said that race, sex, and sexual orientation are all “immutable” personal
characteristics, but it has not defined immutability. See Jessica A. Clarke, Against
Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 34 n.168 (2015) (explaining that the Court’s usage of the term
“immutability” in Obergefell was unclear); infra note 141 and accompanying text. Some
lower courts have said that an immutable trait is not necessarily unchangeable but is at least
difficult to change. See Clarke, supra, at 34–35. Other courts have expanded the definition of
immutability by stating that a trait should be considered immutable whenever it would be
unfair to ask someone to change that aspect of themselves. See id. at 25–26, 35–36; see also
Edward Stein, Immutability and Innateness Arguments About Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual
Rights, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 597, 635 (2014) (critiquing courts’ capacious definition of
“immutability” because it “is just not immutability in the standard sense of the term”).
23. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 583–84 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632
(1996); infra Part I.B (discussing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)).
24. See infra Part I.B (discussing Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198
(2016)).
25. In our constitutional system, old doctrines erode slowly while new ones crystallize
over time. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 935 (“Gradual innovation, in the hope of improvement,
has always been a part of the common law tradition, as it has been a part of American
constitutionalism.”).
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foreign peers long ago bridged the divide between facial discrimination and
disparate impact and have forgone using multiple tiers of review in equal
protection cases.26 Drawing on theories about collective wisdom, we contend
that the experiences of foreign jurisdictions give us good reason to believe
that the Supreme Court is on the right path and should stay its course.27
Moreover, as we explain below, foreign jurisdictions are laboratories of
doctrinal experimentation from which the United States should learn.28
While the Supreme Court should not blindly follow foreign trends, it should
view foreign jurisdictions as helpful sources of information.29
This Article proceed as follows. Parts I and II are primarily descriptive in
nature. Part I traces the gradual blurring of the distinction between facial
discrimination and disparate impact and the collapsing of tiered review in the
United States.30 Part II examines equal protection abroad and focuses
specifically on Canada, South Africa, the Council of Europe, and Hong
Kong. We chose the first three of these jurisdictions because comparativists
commonly view them as leading case studies.31 We added Hong Kong to our
analysis because it has recently addressed the equal protection questions that
we study.32 It also has a legal system that is familiar to, and respected by,
many American lawyers.33 Part II identifies convergences between these
jurisdictions’ laws and recent developments in American equal protection
jurisprudence. These are convergences that have, until now, been overlooked
in the scholarly literature.34

26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part III.B.
28. See infra Part III.C.
29. See Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution:
Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353, 353 (2004). Levinson states:
One obviously need not believe that there is an obligation to be bound by . . . foreign
experience—indeed, I know of no one who makes such a foolish argument—in order
to believe that it is simply prudent practice to become knowledgeable about such
experience and to apply the lessons one finds there to comparable dilemmas facing
us here in the United States.
Id.
30. Other commentators have identified some of the specific data points that comprise
these developments. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129
HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 19 (2015) (noting that dicta in Obergefell helps to blur the line between
facial discrimination and disparate impact). This Article builds on those insights by discussing
how various data points come together to form major trajectories of change.
31. Canada, South Africa, and the Council of Europe (i.e., the European Court of Human
Rights) have developed reputations for respecting the rule of law and producing court opinions
that are frequently cited across borders because of their persuasive reasoning. See infra notes
224–26 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 227–28 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
34. This is the first Article to focus squarely on convergences between U.S. equal
protection doctrine and global developments. Other commentators have written about other
aspects of global convergence. See, e.g., David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and
Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1163, 1187–90 (2011) (reporting on
empirical data that show convergences among written constitutions); Jud Mathews & Alec
Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review and the Problem of
Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 803 (2011) (arguing that dormant Commerce Clause
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Part III takes a prescriptive turn. It discusses what the developments
described in Part II should mean for the future of American constitutional
law. In this Part, we suggest that, while foreign law certainly is not binding
on the United States, the experiences of foreign jurisdictions should
encourage the United States to continue bridging the divide between facial
discrimination and disparate impact and to continue collapsing tiered review.
Moreover, we contend that future Supreme Court opinions should engage
with foreign law more directly and transparently. Doing so would enhance
the strength and clarity of the Court’s reasoning.
Finally, the Conclusion contextualizes this Article’s claims by situating
them before the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s shifting composition. With
Justice Gorsuch’s recent appointment to the Court and the possibility of other
Supreme Court Justices leaving it soon, our conclusion will explore what the
Court’s future composition may mean for the jurisprudential trajectories
currently underway.35
I. EMERGING TRAJECTORIES IN
AMERICAN EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE
The common law often “decides the case first and determines the principle
afterwards,” observed Oliver Wendell Holmes.36 “It is only after a series of
determinations on the same subject-matter, that it becomes necessary . . . by
a true induction[,] to state the principle which has until then been obscurely
felt.”37
Constitutional scholars have since observed that, like the common law,
constitutional doctrine also emerges from inductive reasoning that connects
the dots among earlier cases.38 In this Part, we build on that tradition. We
draw from recent equal protection cases to reveal two emerging trajectories
in doctrinal reform. American equal protection doctrine has long been
characterized by two components: (1) the distinction between facial
discrimination and disparate impact and (2) tiered levels of judicial
scrutiny.39 Both of these components have begun to fray. These changes can
be difficult to see, however, because they are happening beneath the surface

jurisprudence and aspects of various forms of U.S. constitutional review converge with the
“proportionality analysis” commonly engaged in by foreign courts).
35. See Kermit Roosevelt III & Patricia Stottlemyer, The Fight for Equal Protection:
Reconstruction-Redemption Redux, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 36, 36 (2016) (discussing the
possibility of a major change in the Court’s composition).
36. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 1
(1870).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 845, 860–75 (2007) (discussing the inductive reasoning behind landmark
constitutional decisions including Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
39. For an overview of these aspects of equal protection, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6,
at 751–823; infra notes 41–62, 134–48 and accompanying text.
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of recent judicial opinions.40 The following discussion seeks to bring these
changes to light.
To be clear, we make no claim about whether Supreme Court Justices have
been consciously blurring the distinction between facial discrimination and
disparate impact, or consciously collapsing the tiered levels of scrutiny. The
Justices may have been focused on particularities of specific cases, and these
cases may relate to each other and constitute trajectories that the Justices did
not envision. Nonetheless, we submit that we can make logical sense of
recent equal protection cases by identifying, through induction, the emerging
doctrinal trajectories discussed below.
A. Blurring the Line Between
Facial Discrimination and Disparate Impact
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has begun to blur the line between
facial discrimination and disparate impact. Before examining these recent
cases, it is helpful to review earlier cases that established the distinction
between these two types of cases. The 1973 decision in Frontiero v.
Richardson41 is a good place to start. In Frontiero, the plaintiffs challenged
a spousal-benefits policy for military personnel and alleged that it
impermissibly discriminated based on sex.42 The entire Court easily
answered the threshold question whether there was sex discrimination at
issue because the policy explicitly distinguished men from women and
treated them differently in determining spousal benefits.43 In other words,
there was facial discrimination. The plurality subjected this facial
discrimination to heightened scrutiny and struck down the personnel
policy.44
The following year, in the case of Geduldig v. Aiello,45 Carolyn Aiello and
three other women challenged the State of California’s insurance fund for
employees with temporary disabilities because it excluded from coverage all
disabilities resulting from pregnancy.46 The plaintiffs alleged that this
exclusion amounted to unconstitutional sex discrimination.47 California’s
law, however, was facially neutral with respect to sex.48 The law did not treat
women as a class of people but instead impacted certain women based on the
condition of pregnancy.49 In light of these circumstances, the Court adopted
40. This phenomenon is similar to changes in the common law, which Holmes described
as “obscurely felt.” See Holmes, supra note 36, at 1.
41. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
42. Id. at 680 (plurality opinion).
43. Id. at 689–90; id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id.
(Powell, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 689–90 (plurality opinion). A majority of the Court later agreed in Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), that sex discrimination receives heightened scrutiny. Id. at 197.
This Article uses “heightened scrutiny” as an umbrella term referring to standards of judicial
scrutiny that are more stringent than rational basis review.
45. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
46. Id. at 486–90.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 496–97.
49. Id.
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a narrow and formalistic definition of discrimination. Because the insurance
policy did not facially ban either sex from coverage, the Court decided that
the insurance policy did not discriminate based on sex.50
Geduldig barely acknowledged that California’s disability policy
adversely impacted women.51 The Court was also unclear about whether
disparate impact could ever count as discrimination that triggers heightened
scrutiny.52 In Washington v. Davis,53 however, the Court took the
opportunity to elaborate on the difference between facial discrimination and
disparate impact.54 In Davis, two African Americans who applied to join the
Washington, D.C., police force challenged a written personnel test for
screening applicants.55 Neither the test nor the requirement to take the test
overtly differentiated between applicants based on race.56 The plaintiffs,
however, argued that the test bore no relationship to job performance and that
it disproportionately prevented African Americans from joining the force.57
The Court ruled against them and held that disparate racial impact does not
trigger the strict scrutiny applied to overt racial discrimination unless
plaintiffs can show that the government was motivated by “discriminatory
intent”58 or, put differently, “invidious discriminatory purpose.”59
The Court later clarified in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney60 that plaintiffs must prove that the government enacted a policy
“‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.”61 With this requirement, the Court defined discriminatory purpose
so narrowly that it has become virtually impossible to prove.62 State actors
that harbor malicious intent can easily offer pretexts that mask invidious
motives, leaving opponents with the uphill battle of proving that the proffered
reasons for a law were pretextual.63
In short, the Court’s jurisprudence has created two categories of cases. The
first category involves laws that facially discriminate. Laws that facially
50. Id.
51. The Court briefly acknowledged that “only women can become pregnant.” Id. at 496
n.20. It still concluded, however, that “[t]he California insurance program does not exclude
anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical
condition—pregnancy—from the list of compensable disabilities.” Id.
52. The Court did suggest, briefly in a footnote, that it would be unconstitutional for
lawmakers to use “distinctions involving pregnancy . . . [as] mere pretexts designed to affect
an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other.” Id. at 496 n.20.
53. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
54. See id. at 238–48.
55. Id. at 233.
56. Id. at 235.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 237.
59. Id. at 242.
60. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
61. Id. at 258 (refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to preferential treatment granted to
veterans despite its adverse impact on women).
62. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 764 (2011)
(“In the vast run of cases after Feeney, only facial discrimination has drawn heightened
scrutiny under the equal protection guarantees.”).
63. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 386–90 (2007)
(describing the difficulty of satisfying Feeney’s requirement of proving malice).
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discriminate based on certain characteristics, such as race and sex, trigger
rigorous judicial review. The second category of cases involves laws that are
facially neutral but create disparate impacts. Cases in this second category
almost never receive rigorous judicial scrutiny because of the requirement
that plaintiffs must prove invidious intent for alleged disparate impact to
receive that review.64 A technically neutral law or government policy is
likely to receive minimal judicial review no matter how egregiously it affects
traditionally subordinated groups, such as women or people of color.65
The wall that the Supreme Court constructed between disparate impact and
facial discrimination in constitutional cases has long frustrated civil rights
advocates.66 This is not only because invidious intentions can be masked by
pretext but also because laws with harmful discriminatory effects may arise
from unconscious biases.67 This wall, however, has developed significant
cracks. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor put the first crack in the wall in her
concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,68 even though little attention was
drawn to the blow she delivered.69 Although she did not mention Geduldig
explicitly, her reasoning in Lawrence contrasts sharply with that of the earlier
opinion.70
Lawrence addressed Texas’s criminalization of same-sex sodomy.71 The
majority struck down the law based on substantive due process,72 but Justice
O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she rejected the criminal
prohibition based on equal protection; she found that the sodomy ban
impermissibly discriminated based on sexual orientation.73 From early in the
litigation, however, there was debate over the threshold question whether the
statute actually discriminated based on sexual orientation.74 Just as not all
women are, or ever will become, pregnant, not all gay men engage in same64. It is worth noting that, prior to the Supreme Court distinguishing facial discrimination
from disparate impact in equal protection cases, many lower courts rigorously scrutinized
racial disparate impact without first requiring plaintiffs to prove invidious intent. See Reva B.
Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11–13 (2013) (discussing lowercourt disparate impact cases from the 1960s and 1970s).
65. See id. at 47–48 (“Because it is extremely difficult to prove discriminatory purpose
and nearly always possible to find some reason for a government policy with a racial disparate
impact other than a purpose to harm the group, the Davis-Feeney framework allows courts to
immunize most government action against equal protection challenge.”); Yoshino, supra note
62, at 764 (“If legislators have the wit—which they generally do—to avoid words like ‘race’
or the name of a particular racial group in the text of their legislation, the courts will generally
apply ordinary rational basis review.”).
66. See Johnson, supra note 63, at 375 n.5 (listing articles that have criticized the limited
scope of colorable disparate impact claims).
67. For a discussion on the pervasiveness of biases that people hold unconsciously, also
known as implicit biases, see Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness:
Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 465–89 (2010).
68. 539 U.S. 558 (2005).
69. See id. at 583–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
70. See id.
71. Id. at 562 (majority opinion).
72. See id. at 572.
73. See id. at 579–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
74. See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex. App. 2001), rev’d, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
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sex sodomy.75 Meanwhile, the lower state court in Texas explained:
“Persons having a predominately heterosexual inclination may sometimes
engage in homosexual conduct. Thus, the statute’s proscription applies,
facially at least, without respect to a defendant’s sexual orientation.”76
Justice O’Connor rejected the idea that the statute did not discriminate
based on sexual orientation.77 She did not resort to analyzing motive as
required by Washington v. Davis.78 Indeed, she said nothing about the
motive behind Texas’s sodomy ban. Instead, she tersely stated that engaging
in same-sex sodomy is “closely correlated with being homosexual” and,
therefore, that the law is discriminatory.79 Put differently, Justice
O’Connor’s conclusion stems from the nature of the law’s impact on
homosexuals, regardless of the law’s motivations.
Obergefell v. Hodges,80 the case that struck down states’ same-sex
marriage bans, further blurred the line between facial discrimination and
discriminatory impact. Opponents of same-sex marriage have long argued
that banning same-sex marriage does not discriminate based on sexual
orientation, and some judges have endorsed this reasoning.81 In this view,
same-sex marriage bans are facially neutral with respect to sexual orientation
because they prohibit both gay and straight people from marrying partners of
the same sex; meanwhile, gay and straight people alike have the right to
marry someone of the opposite sex.82 Obergefell, however, did not even
bother to address that the law technically treated gay and straight individuals
the same.83
Despite the facial neutrality of same-sex marriage bans,84 Obergefell held
that excluding same-sex couples from marriage violated not only due process
75. Commentators have long noted the fact that discourse on gay identity often wrongly
conflates conduct (sodomy) with status (being gay). See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating
Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Law, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV.
103, 174–77 (2000).
76. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 353.
77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
78. For our earlier discussion of Washington v. Davis’s motive-based requirement, see
supra notes 54–62 and accompanying text.
79. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583–84.
80. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
81. See Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1004 (D. Nev. 2012); In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 465 (Cal. 2008) (Baxter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 521 n.11 (Conn. 2008) (Zarella, J.,
dissenting); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 362–63 (D.C. 1995) (Steadman, J.,
concurring); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 51 n.11 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 975 (Mass. 2003) (Spina, J., dissenting); Hernandez v. Robles, 855
N.E.2d 1, 20 (N.Y. 2006) (Graffeo, J., concurring); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963,
997 (Wash. 2006) (Johnson, J., concurring).
82. For further discussion of this rationale, see generally Peter Nicolas, Gay Rights, Equal
Protection, and the Classification-Framing Quandary, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 329 (2014).
83. See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
84. To be sure, same-sex marriage bans are facially discriminatory with respect to couples.
The bans treat same-sex couples and different-sex couples differently. Yet, for the reasons
described above, the bans are technically neutral with respect to gays and lesbians as
individuals. Note that Obergefell did not focus on the facial discrimination against same-sex
couples; it was ultimately concerned about the bans’ adverse impact on gays and lesbians
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but also equal protection.85 In its equal protection analysis, the Court was
troubled by same-sex marriage bans’ adverse impact on gays and lesbians,
regardless of whether there was invidious intent underlying the bans.86 The
Court never stated that same-sex marriage bans were motivated by
invidiousness.87 To the contrary, the Court stated that “[m]any who deem
same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and
honorable religious or philosophical premises.”88 The Court also stated that
the “nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times.”89
This implied that the state’s traditional exclusion of same-sex couples from
marriage was probably not consciously motivated by a desire to harm gays
and lesbians because, until recently, such harm was not understood.
Rather than focusing on intent, the Court focused on impact. The Court
started by asserting that the fundamental right to marry encompasses the right
to marry a partner of the same sex.90 Instead of mechanistically stating that
infringing fundamental rights triggers strict scrutiny,91 the Court elaborated
on the ways in which marriage bans harm gays and lesbians and their
families.92 The Court explained that the bans inflict potential tangible harms,
such as financial insecurity, upon same-sex couples and their children.93 The
Court further explained that barring same-sex marriage “demeans,”94
“disrespect[s,] and “subordinate[s]”95 gays and lesbians. After fleshing out
these adverse impacts, the Court concluded that same-sex marriage bans
violate equal protection.96
generally. It emphasized that banning same-sex marriage inflicts “disability on gays and
lesbians [and] serves to disrespect and subordinate them.” Id. at 2604. In other writing, one
of us has argued that facial discrimination against same-sex couples should, in and of itself,
be considered a form of impermissible discrimination. See generally Holning Lau,
Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1271 (2006). Additionally, commentators have argued that, although samesex marriage bans are facially neutral with respect to sexual orientation, they are facially
discriminatory with respect to sex. See generally Nan D. Hunter, The Sex Discrimination
Argument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 397 (2001). Obergefell, however, did not adopt
this line of reasoning.
85. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597–604.
86. See id. at 2602–12.
87. See generally id.
88. See id. at 2602 (emphasis added). The Court also said, with respect to opponents of
same-sex marriage, that “neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged [in this decision].” Id.
89. Id. at 2598.
90. Id. at 2604–05.
91. For an example of an older case where the Court reasoned mechanistically that
infringing the fundamental right to marry triggers heightened scrutiny, see Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 383, 388 (1978) (discussing the marriage rights of noncustodial parents who
owe child support). For an example of a lower court adopting this mechanistic review more
recently, see Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 375 (4th Cir. 2014) (reasoning mechanistically
that denying the fundamental right to marry triggers strict scrutiny in equal protection
analysis).
92. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–04.
93. Id. at 2601 (discussing marriage rights’ relation to taxation, inheritance, survivorship,
and other property rights).
94. Id. at 2602.
95. Id. at 2604.
96. Id.
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In recent scholarship, other commentators have observed that the Court
has integrated liberty and equality analyses in cases such as Obergefell.97
This integration comports with our claim that the Court is concerned about
impact in equality cases: the Court’s attention to liberty is essentially
attention to impact. By recognizing that a fundamental liberty was at stake—
not just an ordinary liberty interest—Obergefell underscored the gravity of
the adverse impact of same-sex marriage bans.98
We can compare Obergefell with the Geduldig case discussed earlier.
Geduldig concluded that there was no sex discrimination because not all
women are, or ever will be, pregnant.99 In contrast, Obergefell was much
less concerned about the fact that some gays and lesbians are neither
interested nor ever will be interested in getting married.100 Obergefell did
not bother grappling with this facially neutral element of same-sex marriage
bans.101 It focused instead on discriminatory impact, and such analysis of
impact was missing from Geduldig.102
The most recent case to suggest the Court has begun to conflate facial
discrimination and disparate impact is Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin
(Fisher II).103 Fisher II involved a challenge to an admissions policy at the
University of Texas that filled around 25 percent of its incoming class each
year by reviewing applicants holistically and taking into account numerous
factors, including race.104 Abigail Fisher, a white applicant who was denied
admission, argued that this process violated equal protection because it
overtly considered candidates’ race.105 She believed that the University
could have, and should have, recruited a diverse student body through means
other than overt considerations of race.106 Specifically, she argued that the
University should have expanded the number of students that it admitted
through its “percentage plan” approach.107 Under its existing percentage
plan, the University admitted all students who graduated from a Texas high
school in the top ten percent of their class.108 Because Texas high schools
97. E.g., Tribe, supra note 30, at 29–32; Yoshino, supra note 62, at 748.
98. See Obergefell, 136 S. Ct. at 2602–04.
99. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n. 20 (1974).
100. See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text.
103. 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). After Fisher II, the Court has decided a few equal protection
cases that did not shed any new light on the relationship between facial discrimination and
disparate impact. For example, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017), was a
case of facial sex discrimination, which did not require the Court to elaborate on the
relationship between facial discrimination and disparate impact. Id. at 1697–98. Likewise, the
Court decided the race discrimination case of Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017), in
which the Court did not focus its attention on the significance of discriminatory impact. See
id. Instead, the Court found that lawmakers were impermissibly motivated by race when they
drew legislative districts. Id. at 1481–82. The Court found that lawmakers impermissibly
packed black voters into a few legislative districts to diminish the power of black voters. Id.
104. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2206.
105. Id. at 2207.
106. Id. at 2212.
107. Id. at 2213.
108. Id. at 2205.
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tend to be racially segregated, the percentage plan had the effect of ensuring
a racially heterogeneous group of admitted students, even though the
percentage plan was facially neutral.109 Fisher argued that expanding the
percentage plan approach to admissions would be preferable to the
University’s current approach, which admitted 25 percent of each incoming
class through a holistic review process that considered race.110
The Court rejected Abigail Fisher’s contention and stated that expanding
the percentage plan would not make the University’s admissions program
more race neutral in spirit.111 This was because “boost[ing] minority
enrollment” was a goal undergirding the percentage plan.112 Thus, the Court
likened the facially race-neutral percentage plan to the overtly race-conscious
holistic review. Previously, the Court had only likened disparate impact to
facial discrimination when the government sought to use a facially neutral
law in invidious ways.113 Fisher II further blurs the line between facial
discrimination and disparate impact. In this case, the Court drew a close
comparison between facial discrimination (in the holistic review program)
and disparate impact (from the percentage plan), even though the motivations
behind the disparate impact were benevolent, not malicious.114
Fisher II might lead courts to consider facial discrimination and disparate
impact similarly in future cases. For example, the State of North Carolina
argued that its controversial “bathroom bill,” commonly referred to as
H.B. 2,115 did not discriminate against individuals based on gender identity
because, regardless of whether an individual is transgender or cisgender, the
law required the individual to use a restroom that corresponds to the
individual’s assigned sex at birth.116 This formalistic reasoning is troubling
because transgender people face particular adversity when forced to use a
restroom that corresponds with their birth sex as opposed to their gender
identity.117 In other words, even though H.B. 2 was facially neutral with
109. Id. at 2213.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Indeed, commentators have interpreted Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), as requiring legislative malice in order for disparate impact to
trigger the same judicial review as facial discrimination. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 63, at
388; Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of StatusEnforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1135 (1997).
114. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213.
115. According to H.B. 2, individuals who wish to use single-sex restrooms at public
agencies and public schools must use the restroom that comports with their biological sex
assigned at birth. See H.R. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2d Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016); supra notes 13–
15 and accompanying text.
116. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee and Intervenor/Defendants-Appellees at 36 n.11,
Carcaño v. McCrory, No. 16-1989 (4th Cir., dismissed Nov. 21, 2016) (“HB2 does not
‘facially’ discriminate against transgender people; it ‘facially’ classifies everyone on the basis
of biological characteristics.”).
117. Compared with cisgender people, transgender people who are forced to use restrooms
that correspond with their birth sex face a unique risk of being denied access and being
harassed or assaulted. See generally Jody L. Herman, Gendered Restrooms and Minority
Stress: The Public Regulation of Gender and Its Impact on Transgender People’s Lives, 16 J.
PUB. MGMT. & SOC. POL’Y 65 (2013). For discussion of the “growing push by state legislators
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respect to gender identity, it created adverse effects based on gender identity.
North Carolina, however, asserted that the motivation behind H.B. 2 was not
to subordinate transgender people but rather to achieve the benevolent goal
of protecting the privacy expected by cisgender people.118 Assuming
arguendo that benevolent concerns animated H.B. 2, Fisher II suggests that
such benevolent intentions should not prevent courts from likening the
facially neutral policy to overt discrimination.119 Although North Carolina
recently repealed H.B. 2, at least sixteen states considered passing similar
laws in 2017, and the constitutionality of such efforts is an ongoing
concern.120
To be sure, the facially neutral percentage plan was not the main focus in
Fisher II; accordingly, Fisher II did not speak in detail about bridging the
divide between facial discrimination and disparate impact.121 Nonetheless,
we can see a trend line between Fisher II’s discussion of the percentage plan,
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence, and the majority opinion in
Obergefell.122 These three opinions chip away at the wall that previously
divided facial discrimination and disparate impact.
According to this trajectory, at least some instances of disparate impact
should trigger the same rigorous review that facial discrimination receives,
even if invidious intent cannot be proven.123 Whether disparate impact
receives rigorous review should be determined at least in part by the severity
of the disparate impact and not solely by the intent of the state actor. Based
on the recent cases we have examined, however, it is unclear how severe a
disparate impact must be to warrant rigorous review. Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence in Lawrence suggests that courts should consider the
quantitative aspect of impact.124 To reach her conclusion that the facially
neutral sodomy law discriminated based on sexual orientation, she invoked
statistics and noted that the law’s impact “closely correlated” with being
gay.125 The majority in Obergefell looked beyond statistics and drew
attention to the qualitative aspect of impact.126 It noted that marriage bans,
which were facially neutral with respect to sexual orientation, harmed gay

to regulate trans bathroom use,” see Stephen Rushin & Jenny Carroll, Bathroom Laws as
Status Crimes, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8–12 (2017).
118. See Answer and Counterclaims of the State of North Carolina, Governor Patrick L.
McCrory, and the North Carolina Department of Public Safety at 25, United States v. North
Carolina, 1:16-CV-00425 (M.D.N.C. dismissed June 2, 2016).
119. Recall that, in Fisher II, the facially neutral percentage plan was motivated by
benevolent race-consciousness, and the Court likened the percentage plan to the University’s
holistic review program, which overtly considered race. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213.
120. See Joellen Kralik, “Bathroom Bill” Legislative Tracking, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (July 28, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-bathroom-billlegislative-tracking635951130.aspx [https://perma.cc/TEG7-WYYB].
121. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213.
122. For a discussion of Lawrence and Obergefell, see supra notes 77–102 and
accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 69–102 and accompanying text.
124. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
125. Id.
126. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–04 (2015).
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people in both tangible and intangible ways.127 While these two opinions
demonstrate that courts could examine disparate impact from both
quantitative and qualitative perspectives, they do not clearly delineate a point
at which disparate impact becomes significant enough to warrant rigorous
judicial review.
It is worth emphasizing again that the blurring of facial discrimination and
disparate impact is very recent—the Court did not decide Obergefell until
2015,128 and Fisher was decided in 2016.129 For decades prior, the Court and
lower federal courts subjected disparate impact to minimal judicial review
because invidious intent could not be proven in accordance with Feeney.130
For example, courts have applied minimal review to facially neutral criminal
laws that adversely affect persons of color and to facially neutral school
districting policies that create de facto racial segregation.131 It is yet to be
seen whether courts will note that the line between facial discrimination and
disparate impact has become blurred and then further blur that line.132 In Part
III, we argue in favor of continuing this trajectory of change.
B. Collapsing Standards of Review
In addition to examining the distinction between facial discrimination and
disparate impact, courts traditionally have also considered the characteristic
on which a law discriminates to determine the standard of review in equal
protection cases.133 It is conventional wisdom that different characteristics—
such as race, sex, and sexual orientation—trigger a different tier of review.
We contend, however, that this tiered system has begun to collapse.
Before discussing how tiers of equal protection review have collapsed, an
examination of how the Court constructed tiers in the first place is in order.
It is generally understood that the Court has explicitly articulated three
standards of review in equal protection cases: strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, and rational basis review.134 Each standard has its own means-ends
test for evaluating whether the state has violated the Constitution. To justify
a discriminatory law under strict scrutiny, the state must prove that the law is
“narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling government interest.”135
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2584.
129. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2198 (2016).
130. See Siegel, supra note 64, 22–23, 47–50 (discussing various litigation concerning de
facto school segregation and racial impact in the criminal justice system).
131. See id.
132. Further, even if courts agree that laws can trigger rigorous review because of their
disparate impact regardless of legislative intent, courts might fail to see the intangible ways in
which some laws impact groups of people differently. Cf. Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
Undignified: The Supreme Court, Racial Justice, and Dignity Claims, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1, 22–
24 (2017) (arguing that the Supreme Court has largely failed to recognize the dignity interests
of marginalized social groups).
133. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 699–702.
134. See id.
135. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[Suspect]
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests.”).
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According to intermediate scrutiny, the state must show that its
discriminatory law is “substantially related” to an “important government
interest.”136 Under rational basis review, a law violates equal protection if it
is not “reasonably related” to any “legitimate government interest.”137
Commentators refer to these standards as “tiers” because, for a long time,
it was conventionally understood that each standard corresponded with a
different level—or tier—of rigor with which the Court would review and
strike down laws.138 Commentators have called strict scrutiny “fatal in fact”
because, in the past, laws were extremely unlikely to pass such a rigorous
test.139 In contrast, the Court was unlikely to strike down laws under rational
basis review.140 Meanwhile, intermediate scrutiny has fallen somewhere in
between, requiring the Court to engage in a balancing act.141
In this Article, we pay particular attention to race, sex, and sexual
orientation discrimination because they have been the primary subjects of the
The Court has
Court’s recent equal protection jurisprudence.142
acknowledged that race, sex, and sexual orientation have served as bases for
unfair subordination throughout much of history.143 The Court has also said

136. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“[T]he [defender of the
challenged action] must show ‘at least that the [challenged] classification serves important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives.’” (third alteration in original) (quoting Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982))); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(stating that, for sex discrimination to be justified, it “must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives”).
137. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (“[U]nless . . . it jeopardizes exercise
of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the
Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state
interest.”).
138. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 483
(2004); Stearns, supra note 21 (manuscript at 3–4); Yoshino, supra note 62, at 755–57.
139. E.g., Gunther, supra note 20, at 8; Yoshino, supra note 62, at 755 n.61.
140. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 138, at 489 (“[Under] rational basis review, the Court
highlights its deferential approach to the law and policymaking branches.”); Yoshino, supra
note 62, at 755–56 (“[R]ational basis review generally results in the validation of state
action.”).
141. “‘Intermediate scrutiny,’ unlike the poles of the two-tier system, is an overtly
balancing mode.” Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization
and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297 (1992).
142. The doctrinal trajectories that we discuss began to emerge over the past decade or two.
During this time, the Court’s landmark equal protection cases focused on race, sex, and sexualorientation discrimination. A notable exception is Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
Commentators believe that Bush v. Gore was framed so narrowly that it has virtually no
precedential value. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal
Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 386–87 (2001) (arguing that the
Supreme Court limited its language in Bush v. Gore so explicitly and “extraordinar[ily]” to
the facts of that case that it “appeared to dismiss any precedential value this case may have for
future election law cases”); Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and
the Law of Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 65, 70–71 (2002) (commenting that Bush
v. Gore has an explicit statement of its lack of precedential value).
143. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015) (emphasizing that gays
and lesbians have suffered “a long history of disapproval of their relationships”); Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997) (acknowledging “widespread and persisting deprivation of
constitutional rights resulting from this country’s history of racial discrimination”); Frontiero
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that race, sex, and sexual orientation are all “immutable,” thus suggesting that
these traits usually cannot be changed without imposing a great deal of
hardship on individuals.144 Despite recognizing these similarities, the Court
has designated different tiers of review to these statuses.
The Court says it applies strict scrutiny to race discrimination and
intermediate scrutiny to sex discrimination.145 This difference reflects the
Court’s understanding that race discrimination is “so seldom relevant” to
government goals,146 while “natural differences between the sexes are
sometimes relevant and sometimes wholly irrelevant.”147 Meanwhile, the
Court has applied rational basis review to sexual orientation discrimination
but has also avoided explicitly identifying its standard of review in recent
sexual orientation cases.148
The tiered framework of review has sparked widespread criticism.149 A
frequent critique is that, despite what the Court says it is doing, it has actually
developed more than just three tiers of review and that the proliferation of
tiers has become unwieldy.150 Commentators have argued that, as a de facto
matter, the Court has been applying four, five, six, or even seven different

v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging “a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination”).
144. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (calling sexual orientation “a normal expression of
human sexuality and immutable”); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (“[S]ex, like race and national
origin, is an immutable characteristic.”). Although the Supreme Court has not defined
“immutability” clearly, some lower courts have said that calling a trait immutable does not
necessarily mean that the trait is unchangeable; instead, immutability means that the trait is at
least difficult for many people to change. See Clarke, supra note 22, at 34–35. Other courts
have expanded the definition of immutability by stating that a trait should be considered
immutable whenever it would be unfair to ask someone to change that aspect of themselves.
See id. at 25–26, 35–36.
145. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to women’s exclusion from a military academy); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny to a race-conscious affirmative action
program).
146. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 442 (1985)
(discussing why discrimination based on mental disability is to be distinguished from
discrimination based on race, national origin, and alienage).
147. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 497 n.4 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing the majority’s reason for subjecting sex discrimination to intermediate scrutiny in
a case concerning gender bias in statutory rape laws).
148. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (stating that the Court would analyze
whether the disputed state measure, which discriminated against gays and lesbians, “bears a
rational relation to some legitimate end”); infra notes 173–87 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court’s failure to identify its standard of review in recent sexual orientation
cases); see also Nan D. Hunter, Interpreting Liberty and Equality Through the Lens of
Marriage, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 107, 113–14 (2015) (explaining that it is unclear what level
of scrutiny the Court will apply to sexual-orientation discrimination in future cases).
149. For critiques of the tiered framework of review, see generally Sarah EricksonMuschko, What Is the Purpose? Affirmative Action, DOMA, and the Untenable Tiered
Framework for Equal Protection Review, 101 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 44 (2013); Fleming, supra
note 21; Goldberg, supra note 138; Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming
Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161 (1984); Stearns, supra note 21;
Note, Justice Stevens’ Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1987).
150. E.g., Fleming, supra note 21, at 2304; Smith, supra note 20, at 2774; Stearns, supra
note 21 (manuscript at 4).
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tiers.151 Many commentators believe that a fourth tier of scrutiny is apparent
in sexual-orientation discrimination cases.152 Consider, for example, United
States v. Windsor.153 There, the Court did not explicitly identify the tier of
review that it used to strike down part of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) for discrimination based on sexual orientation.154 Under
conventional wisdom, rational basis review is the default if the Court does
not state that is applying intermediate or strict scrutiny.155 In Windsor,
however, the Court’s actions did not comport with traditional understandings
of rational basis review. It held that section 3 of DOMA violated equal
protection because it stemmed from animus, despite the government’s
contentions to the contrary.156 The government claimed that DOMA grew
out of a desire for administrative ease and that creating a uniform definition
of marriage advanced that interest.157 In rejecting this argument, the Court
implied that the claim was pretext and did not defer to the government as
rational basis review would traditionally require.158 Thus, commentators
have labeled this search for animus a new tier of review—sometimes called
“rational basis with bite”159 or “a more searching form of rational basis
review.”160
While rational basis review “with bite” destabilizes the Court’s official
three-tier framework, the framework is also destabilized by the weakening of
strict scrutiny. In Fisher II, the Court purported to apply strict scrutiny, but
many commentators contend that the Court applied a less rigorous standard
instead.161 In analyzing the University of Texas’s holistic admissions
151. See Fleming, supra note 21, at 2304 (listing six tiers); R. Randall Kelso, Standards of
Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting
Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 225, 226 (2002) (listing seven tiers); Smith, supra note 20, at 2774 (listing four
tiers); Stearns, supra note 21 (manuscript at 4) (listing five tiers).
152. E.g., Fleming, supra note 21, at 2308; Smith, supra note 20, at 2774; Stearns, supra
note 21 (manuscript at 43–45).
153. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
154. This may be a sign that the Court has grown ambivalent about its tiers of review. See
Katie R. Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 527, 530 n.7 (2014) (listing examples of commentators who interpret the
Court’s gay rights cases to indicate a shift away from tiered review).
155. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 698–702.
156. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
157. Id. at 2690.
158. See id. at 2694; see also Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from
Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 247 (explaining that when the Court has found indicia of
animus behind a law, such as DOMA, it does not defer to the government’s assertion of
interests as it would under traditional rational basis review).
159. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 20, at 2774.
160. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). For an
argument that rational basis review has long fluctuated in intensity despite the conventional
depiction of rational basis review as being uniformly weak, see Katie Eyer, The Canon of
Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
161. Commentators from both sides of the ideological spectrum have alleged that the Court
applied a less rigorous standard than usual strict scrutiny. See, e.g., The Editors, In Fisher,
Another Blow to Equal Opportunity, NAT’L REV. (June 23, 2016, 6:22 PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/437047/fisher-v-ut-supreme-court-gets-it-wrong
[https://perma.cc/K34H-7QTX]; Richard Lempert, In Fisher, Affirmative Action Survives
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program, the Court deferred substantially to the University’s belief that it had
a compelling interest in securing a diverse student body and that race-based
affirmative action was necessary to achieve that goal.162 By taking such a
relaxed approach to strict scrutiny, the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis begins
to look less rigorous.163
The three-tier framework of equal protection has outlived its helpfulness.
The Court struggles with situating cases into the rigid tiers.164 Perhaps this
is why, in recent sexual-orientation cases, the Court has chosen not to speak
of the tiered framework at all.165 Likewise, in its most recent sex
discrimination case, Sessions v. Morales-Santana,166 the Court did not once
utter the phrase “intermediate scrutiny.”167 The gradual collapse of the tiered

Again, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (June 24, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/
2016/06/24/in-fisher-affirmative-action-survives-again
[https://perma.cc/A6DD-TWES];
George A. Nation III, Something Strange Indeed, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 27, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2016/06/27/problems-justice-anthony-kennedysopinion-fisher-ii-case-essay [https://perma.cc/S6BX-YB2A]; Mark Joseph Stern, Supreme
Court Affirms Constitutionality of Texas Affirmative Action Program, SLATE (June 23, 2016,
10:49 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/06/23/fisher_v_texas_supreme_
court_affirms_constitutionality_of_affirmative_action.html [https://perma.cc/3XCY-FCBH].
162. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (stating
that the Court would grant some deference to the University’s definition of the educational
goals served by affirmative action and that the University need not exhaust all race-neutral
alternatives to race-based affirmative action). Prior to Fisher II, the Court wavered on how
rigorously it should review race-based affirmative action programs. At one point, the Court
applied only intermediate scrutiny to such programs. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547, 564 (1990). The Court eventually replaced intermediate scrutiny with strict scrutiny. See
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Still, the Court fluctuated
regarding how to define strict scrutiny. In the affirmative action case of Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003), the Court was quite deferential to the University of Michigan, defined
“narrow tailoring” loosely, and stated that narrow tailoring “does not require exhaustion of
every conceivable race-neutral alternative.” Id. at 339. In Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), the Court cast some doubt on whether it would
preserve Grutter’s deferential approach, id. at 2418–19, but Fisher II eventually confirmed
this deferential approach, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208. For a more detailed discussion of this
line of cases, see generally Stearns, supra note 21.
163. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. For arguments that strict scrutiny has
been less rigorous than conventionally understood, even prior to Fisher II, see generally Ozan
O. Varol, Strict in Theory, but Accommodating in Fact?, 75 MO. L. REV. 1243 (2010); Adam
Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006).
164. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text.
165. Numerous commentators have interpreted the Court’s gay rights cases as a shift away
from tiered review. See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 154, at 530 n.7 (listing sources that adopt this
interpretation of the Court’s gay rights jurisprudence). In this Article, we build on this
literature by showing that the Court is not only moving away from tiered review but is
gradually replacing tiered review with a unitary balancing test that, in some respects,
resembles the proportionality analyses that foreign jurisdictions commonly perform in equality
cases.
166. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
167. See id. Instead, Morales-Santana used the phrase “heightened scrutiny,” which
commentators have employed as an umbrella term to describe any scrutiny that is more
rigorous than rational basis review. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 138, at 483 n.11 (referring
to heightened scrutiny as “all levels of review above rational basis”); Christopher R. Leslie,
Embracing Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage Laws and Heightened Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L.
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framework has left lower courts with unclear doctrine that is difficult to
follow. As Nan Hunter has suggested, the Court is in an “interregnum”—an
interval between doctrinal reigns.168 The reign of tiered review seems near
its end, but the Court has yet to name its successor.
Even so, a new doctrinal approach is beginning to emerge. Instead of
seeing recent cases as a proliferation of tiers, as some commentators do,169
we believe the existing tiers are collapsing into a unitary balancing test.170
To be clear, the pattern that we see thus far emerges from the Court’s recent
cases, which pertain to discrimination based on personal characteristics that
are difficult to change—namely race, sex, and sexual orientation.171 Thus,
we are unable to say whether the emergence of a unitary standard will also
apply to discrimination based on characteristics that are either not personal
or not difficult to change, such as the differential treatment of licensed
optometrists and ophthalmologists versus unlicensed opticians at issue in the
old case of Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.172
In recent U.S. equal protection cases, the Court seems to consider the same
four key factors, regardless of whether it is reviewing a law concerning race,
sex, or sexual orientation. These factors are (1) the role of prejudice, in the
form of animus or stereotyping behind the law, (2) the seriousness of harm
caused by the law, (3) governmental goals behind the law, and (4) the extent
to which the law is related to achieving those government interests.
The last two factors reflect the means-ends analysis that is conventional in
equal protection analyses. As a de jure matter, the Court says it calibrates the
means-ends analysis based on the ground of discrimination at issue (race,
sexual orientation, or sex) because it assigns a tier of scrutiny according to
the discriminatory ground. As a de facto matter, however, the Court’s meansends analysis is not calibrated as such. Instead, the Court adjusts its meansends analysis based on the first two factors.

REV. 1077, 1084 (2014) (“Both strict and intermediate scrutiny are forms of heightened
scrutiny.”).
168. See Nan D. Hunter, Twenty-First Century Equal Protection: Making Law in an
Interregnum, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 141, 141 (2006).
169. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
170. See Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 945, 946 (2004) (“[T]he neat compartments of tiered scrutiny are beginning to
collapse.”); Peter S. Smith, The Demise of Three-Tier Review: Has the United States Supreme
Court Adopted a “Sliding Scale” Approach Toward Equal Protection Jurisprudence?, 23 J.
CONTEMP. L. 475, 476 (1997) (“[T]he Rehnquist Court is moving away from this [tiered]
framework toward a more flexible approach.”).
171. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of Supreme Court
equal protection cases over the past two decades). While the Supreme Court has decided
recent cases concerning statutory prohibitions of discrimination based on personal
characteristics beyond race, sex, and sexual orientation, the Court has not addressed such
discrimination from the equal protection angle in recent years. See Michael E. Waterstone,
Disability Constitutional Law, 63 EMORY L.J. 527, 529 (2014) (noting that Court has not
decided a disability discrimination case based on equal protection since 1985).
172. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The court in Lee Optical Co. applied rational basis review to a
law that discriminated between licensed optometrists and ophthalmologists on the one hand,
and unlicensed opticians on the other. Id. at 483.
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Consider the example of sexual orientation. In recent cases, the Court has
refused to assign any of the three traditional tiers of means-ends analysis to
sexual-orientation discrimination.173 Instead, in cases of sexual-orientation
discrimination, the Court’s means-ends analysis has been part of a larger
analysis that considers all four of the factors identified above. In Windsor,
the Court noted that it struck down section 3 of DOMA because “no
legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect [of DOMA] to
disparage and to injure” same-sex couples.174 This statement reflects the
Court’s consideration of animus (i.e., the purpose to disparage and injure) as
well as DOMA’s harmful effects. After Windsor found that DOMA was
motivated by animus and had injurious effects,175 the Court seemed to ratchet
up its means-ends analysis, although it did not acknowledge this explicitly.
The government claimed that DOMA advanced a legitimate government
interest in administrative clarity because maintaining a uniform definition of
marriage allowed the federal government to avoid difficult choice-of-law
problems.176 The Court in Windsor, however, did not defer to the
government’s assertion. Instead, it conducted a more rigorous means-ends
analysis than rational basis would usually require and ultimately rejected the
state’s purported interest in promoting uniformity.177 Windsor thus
calibrated its means-ends analysis in light of the animus behind the law and
the law’s harmful effects; more rigorous evidence of DOMA advancing a
legitimate government goal was needed to counterbalance the Court’s
concerns about animus and DOMA’s injurious effects.
The Court’s other landmark same-sex marriage case, Obergefell, also
reflects a judicial consideration of the four factors we identified. First,
Obergefell acknowledged that same-sex marriage bans are not necessarily
motivated by animus or stereotypes.178 Next, however, Obergefell
emphasized the grave injury of denying same-sex couples the fundamental
right to marry.179 Interestingly, Obergefell did not reason mechanistically
that infringing on a fundamental right triggers “strict scrutiny,” which the
Court had done in earlier cases.180 The Court never once says it is applying

173. See generally Hunter, supra note 148 (tracing the trajectory of the Court’s gay rights
cases).
174. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
175. See id. at 2693 (“This is strong evidence of [DOMA] having the purpose and effect of
disapproval of a class recognized and protected by state law.”).
176. The dissenting opinions by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia both accepted this
contention about uniformity and stability. See id. at 2696 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 2708
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. For thoughtful elaboration on this point, see Carpenter, supra note 158, at 247.
178. For our earlier discussion about Obergefell’s acknowledgement that same-sex
marriage bans do not necessarily stem from animus, see supra notes 86–89 and accompanying
text.
179. For our earlier discussion about Obergefell’s elaboration on the harms of same-sex
marriage bans, see supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383, 388 (1978) (discussing the marriage
rights of noncustodial parents who owe child support).
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“strict scrutiny” in its opinion.181 Instead, the Court engaged in a more fluid
analysis of whether the infringement could be justified.182
The Court discussed two purported government goals behind banning
same-sex marriage. The state-defendants first argued that the government
had an interest in “proceed[ing] with caution” by taking more time to
implement social change.183 In rejecting this argument, the Court did not
speak in terms of “strict scrutiny,” “compelling interest,” or “narrow
tailoring.”184 Instead, the Court reasoned that the government’s interest in
using marriage bans to promote incrementalism did not outweigh the
“injuries” and dignitary wounds inflicted by marriage bans.185 The Court
also rejected the government’s claim that same-sex marriage bans help to
prevent declining rates of marriage among different-sex couples.186 There
was simply no evidence to show that legalizing same-sex marriage would
have an effect on different-sex couples’ decision-making about marriage.187
In sum, Obergefell struck down marriage bans after the weighing of four
factors—the lack of animus, the bans’ harmful effects, the governments’
goals, and the insufficient connection of marriage bans to those goals.
The collapsing of tiered review is also evident in Fisher II. As we
discussed earlier, Fisher II paid lip service to strict scrutiny when it seemed
to engage in a more lenient standard of review instead.188 The Court was
opaque as to why it deviated from traditional strict scrutiny. To understand
this deviation, it is helpful to remember that, for a brief period, the Court had
explicitly applied a lesser standard of review—intermediate scrutiny—to
race-based affirmative action programs.189 During this time, Justice William
Brennan reasoned that affirmative action programs only trigger intermediate
scrutiny because the programs’ use of racial classifications were
benevolent.190 One way to understand Fisher II is to view it as a de facto
retreat back toward Justice Brennan’s reasoning.
In Fisher II, the Court accepted that the University’s use of racial
categories was benevolent.191 The program was intended to ameliorate,
rather than perpetuate, racial animus and stereotyping.192 Indeed, the Court
accepted that the program’s purposes and effects included “the destruction of
181. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584–611 (2015).
182. See id. at 2605–07.
183. Id. at 2605.
184. See generally id.
185. See id. at 2606.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 2607.
188. See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text.
189. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600 (1990) (holding that the FCC’s
“minority preference policies” passed intermediate scrutiny).
190. In a dissent, Justice Brennan argued for intermediate scrutiny. Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). He later joined a plurality
opinion applying intermediate scrutiny, see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 517 (1980),
and applied intermediate scrutiny in a majority opinion, see Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 600–
01.
191. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210–11 (2016).
192. Id. at 2211.
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stereotypes, the promot[ion of] cross-racial understanding, [and] the
preparation of a student body for an increasingly diverse workforce and
Moreover, the Court suggested that these beneficial
society.”193
consequences of having a diverse student body outweighed the harms alleged
by the dissenting Justices.194 Reading Fisher II through the lens of Justice
Brennan’s earlier decisions leads one to believe that the benevolent purposes
and salutary effects of the University’s admissions program led the Court to
relax its so-called strict scrutiny of the program.195 In this view, Fisher II
comports with the multifactor analysis that we have identified.196
Fisher II contrasts with Cooper v. Harris,197 which the Court decided a
year later.198 Both cases concerned race, but the Court calibrated strict
scrutiny differently. The Court did not explicitly acknowledge or explain this
difference, but one way to understand the difference is to view the
calibrations as linked to considerations of intent and harm, in accordance with
the multifactor analysis identified above.199 Harris invalidated two
legislative districting maps that North Carolina redrew based predominately
on race.200 The Court exercised a less deferential form of review than it did
in Fisher II, perhaps because of the harms posed by the districting maps.201
The maps harmed African American voters by packing them into two
districts and diminishing their political power in neighboring districts.202
North Carolina had claimed that it needed to pack African Americans into
the two districts to empower African American voters within those districts
in compliance with the Voting Rights Act.203 Instead of deferring to North
Carolina, the Court held that North Carolina lacked any “good reason” to

193. Id.
194. Three dissenting Justices claimed that the University’s admissions program harmed
Asian American applicants and other applicants who did not receive a “boost” based on race.
See id. at 2227 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
195. For Justice Brennan’s opinions applying intermediate scrutiny to benign racial
classifications, see supra note 190 and accompanying text.
196. Recall that we believe that the Court is modulating its means-ends analysis based not
on the ground of discrimination (e.g., race, sex, and sexual orientation) but based instead on
consideration of prejudice in the form of animus or stereotypes and the seriousness of injury
created by the discrimination. See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text.
197. 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
198. See id. at 1481–82 (finding legislative maps for North Carolina Districts 1 and 12 to
be unconstitutional).
199. See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text.
200. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1468 (affirming the trial court’s finding that North Carolina drew
both legislative districts based predominately on race.).
201. Id. at 1481–82.
202. See Adam Liptak, Justices Reject 2 Districts in North Carolina, Citing Packing of
Black Voters, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/us/politics/
supreme-court-north-carolina-congressional-districts.html [https://perma.cc/YA8Z-DXMC]
(relating Harris to earlier cases in which the Court acknowledged that packing African
American voters into a small number of districts dilutes their voting power).
203. North Carolina asserted this justification with respect to District 1. See Harris, 137 S.
Ct. at 1468. With respect to District 12, North Carolina argued that its map was not racially
motivated instead of arguing that the consideration of race was justified. See id. at 1473.
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believe its claim to be true because African Americans already wielded
sufficient power within the two districts to elect their preferred candidates.204
Finally, the Court’s three most recent sex discrimination cases also seem
to fit the multifactor analysis that we have identified. In United States v.
Virginia,205 the Court applied a version of intermediate scrutiny that seemed
rather strict and ultimately struck down the exclusion of women from the
Virginia Military Institute.206 The Court noted that the means-ends analysis
must be “exceedingly persuasive.”207 By contrast, in Nguyen v. INS,208 the
Court applied intermediate scrutiny in a much less exacting manner, which
led commentators to allege that the Court had abandoned the spirit of
requiring “exceedingly persuasive justifications” for differential treatment
based on sex.209 Nguyen ultimately upheld immigration rules that treated
unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers differently.210 More recently, the
Court again applied a rigorous form of heightened scrutiny in MoralesSantana and struck down a different immigration rule that also discriminated
between unwed mothers and fathers.211
The tension in these sex discrimination cases can be reconciled by focusing
on the Court’s concerns about gender stereotypes. On one hand, the Court
believed that the exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute was
based on harmful gender stereotypes.212 Likewise, in Morales-Santana, the
Court found that the immigration rule at issue, which imposed a longer
residency requirement on unwed fathers seeking to confer citizenship on their
children, reflected gender stereotypes about parenting.213 On the other hand,
the majority in Nguyen found that the challenged immigration rule
distinguished between men and women because of “real” biological
differences as opposed to stereotypes.214
It seems that the Court relaxed its means-ends analysis in Nguyen because
it believed that the immigration policy was motivated by neither stereotype
nor animus.215 By juxtaposing these three sex discrimination cases, we see
more signs that the Court is concerned with the four factors we identified. In
204. Id. at 1482.
205. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
206. See id. at 558.
207. Id. at 531.
208. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
209. See Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical
Dynamics of Change, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 830–32 (2004); Stearns, supra note 21
(manuscript at 19); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 735, 741 n.48 (2002).
210. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 72–73.
211. Id.
212. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 549–50.
213. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1684–85 (2017).
214. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 54.
215. For elaboration on this observation, see Mayeri, supra note 209, at 803–32; Stearns,
supra note 21 (manuscript at 19–20); Sullivan, supra note 209, at 741 n.48. For a discussion
on how the majority and dissenting opinions in Nguyen v. INS rejected gender stereotyping in
principle but disagreed on whether the immigration policy at issue stemmed from stereotypes,
see Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 469–
72 (2007).

1276

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

these cases, the Court seems to be calibrating its means-ends analysis based
on the relevance of stereotyping, and stereotyping’s attendant harms, to the
case at hand.216 The Court is not calibrating its means-ends analysis based
on the existence of a sex-based classification per se, but it is instead
calibrating the analysis based on whether there are indicia of stereotyping
behind the sex-based categories.
In sum, if we look at the Court’s recent equal protection cases—which
have addressed discrimination based on sexual orientation, race, and sex—
we see that the tiered system of review has begun to fray. In sexualorientation cases, the Court has chosen not to assign sexual orientation to any
specific tier of scrutiny.217 Meanwhile, in the race and sex discrimination
cases, the Court seems to be using the tiered structure in name only.218 The
case law seems muddled and confusing. We can make sense of these cases,
however, if we understand them as the beginning of a jurisprudential
trajectory away from tiered analysis toward a unitary standard of review.
Under this standard, the Court calibrates its mean-ends analysis not based on
the grounds of discrimination at issue but on considerations of animus and
stereotyping as motivations for the challenged law and on the harm the law
inflicts on people’s lived experiences.
If the Court continues along this jurisprudential trajectory, it should be
more explicit about jettisoning tiered review of discrimination based on
personal characteristics. The Court should also speak more clearly about how
the four factors that we have identified interrelate in the Court’s evaluation
of equal protection. Further, the Court should clarify whether the emerging
standard applies to personal characteristics beyond race, sex, and sexual
orientation. We believe it should apply at least to additional characteristics
that are difficult to change and have a history of being the bases of
prejudice—features that the Court has emphasized when talking about race,
sex, and sexual orientation.219 It is less clear, however, whether the same

216. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68; Virginia, 518 U.S. at 549–50.
217. See supra notes 173–87 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 188–216 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text. For example, we believe that the
emerging standard should apply to disability because disability status has long been a basis of
prejudice and an individual’s disabilities are difficult to change. Cf. Waterstone, supra note
171, at 572–73 (arguing that the logic of recent equal protection cases concerning sexual
orientation should be extended to cases concerning disability discrimination). Although
commentators sometimes contend that a group’s political power (or lack thereof) should be a
factor in determining what tier of scrutiny that group receives, we do not believe that political
power should guide whether to apply the Court’s emerging unitary standard. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to engage in a full discussion on the relationship between political
powerlessness and equal protection; it is worth noting, however, that we agree with
commentators who have concluded that political powerlessness is already no longer a required
factor in equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d
Cir. 2012) (arguing that political powerlessness is not a necessary factor for determining the
tier of review in equal protection cases); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Is Political Powerlessness
a Requirement for Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 7–10 (2010)
(contending that political powerlessness is not necessary to equal protection analysis).
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unitary standard of review would apply to discrimination based on
characteristics that are not personal or not difficult to change.220
To be sure, some Justices have argued explicitly for a unitary approach to
equal protection. Justices Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens argued
for unitary standards in concurring and dissenting opinions years ago.221
Neither Justice, however, had the opportunity to thoroughly explain what a
unitary standard should look like. In the following Parts, we demonstrate that
foreign jurisdictions have developed a great deal of case law that applies
unitary tests to equal protection cases. This body of jurisprudence can help
the Supreme Court to clarify the direction of its own doctrinal development.
II. GROWING GLOBAL CONVERGENCE
In blurring the distinction between facial discrimination and disparate
impact and in collapsing tiered review of equal protection cases, the Supreme
Court has brought the United States closer in line with major foreign
jurisdictions. In other words, the two jurisprudential trajectories that we
identified in the previous Part combine to form a third trajectory: global
convergence.
In Part III of this Article, we turn to the prescriptive significance of the
United States’ emerging convergence with foreign jurisdictions. We argue
that, in the future, the Supreme Court should engage foreign equality
jurisprudence more openly and directly.222 Foreign law certainly is not
binding on the United States, but the Supreme Court can improve its own
reasoning by drawing on information from abroad.223 Before we turn to that
prescriptive claim, however, we lay the groundwork by illustrating the ways
in which the United States is already converging with foreign peers. Part II.A
sheds light on convergence with respect to the bridging of facial
discrimination and disparate impact. Part II.B illuminates convergence with
respect to replacing tiered review with a unitary standard of review.
In this Article, we do not purport to survey all the jurisdictions of the
world. Instead, we focus on three jurisdictions that are commonly viewed as
jurisprudential leaders in the global arena: Canada, South Africa, and the
Council of Europe.224 These jurisdictions have developed reputations for
220. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
221. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (critiquing
the tiered approach to equal protection because “[t]here is only one Equal Protection Clause”);
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (expressing dissatisfaction with tiered review because “this Court’s decisions in
the field of equal protection defy such easy categorization”).
222. See infra Part III.
223. See Levinson, supra note 29, at 353 (discussing the value of foreign law as persuasive
authority).
224. The Council of Europe is a regional organization that focuses on human rights issues.
The Council of Europe predates, and should not be confused with, the European Union. The
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is binding on members of the Council of
Europe.
See ECHR—Introduction, ECHR-ONLINE.INFO, http://echr-online.info/echrintroduction [https://perma.cc/4C8B-8FH7] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). The Council of
Europe’s most well-known institution is the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which
interprets the ECHR and serves as a court of last resort for human rights claims in Europe.
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respecting the rule of law and producing court opinions that are frequently
cited across borders because of their persuasive reasoning.225 These
jurisdictions have also become frequent case studies in comparative
constitutional law scholarship.226 Our analysis below of Canada, South
Africa, and the Council of Europe shows how the United States’ equal
protection doctrine is converging with equality jurisprudence of these leaders
in the global arena.
To provide additional texture to our analysis, we also discuss
developments in Hong Kong. Although Hong Kong is not one of the “usual
suspects” in comparative analysis,227 its recent case law has addressed the
distinction between facial discrimination and disparate impact and has
refined Hong Kong’s standard of review for equal protection.228 Hong Kong
is also a jurisdiction familiar to many American lawyers because of its
reputable legal system and the role of English as a lingua franca in Hong

For more background on the Council of Europe, see COUNCIL EUR., http://www.coe.int
[https://perma.cc/69YY-JRQ9] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
225. Among national apex courts, “[t]he South African and Canadian constitutional courts
have both been highly influential, apparently more so than the U.S. Supreme Court and other
older and more established constitutional courts.” Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Brave New
Judicial World, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 277, 289 (Michael
Ignatieff ed., 2005). According to Anne-Marie Slaughter, one reason these courts have
become so influential is that they have been effective at drawing lessons from across the globe;
these courts “capture and crystallize the work of their fellow constitutional judges around the
world.” Id.; see also Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation,
in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253, 258 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D. Donahue
eds., 2000) (“[I]deas and constitutionalists of Canada have been disproportionately
influential.”); Adam Liptak, U.S. Court Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/us/18legal.html [https://perma.cc/7ZHT-BQVP]
(“Many legal scholars singled out the Canadian Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court
of South Africa as increasingly influential.”). The Council of Europe’s adjudicatory body,
ECtHR, is frequently cited as persuasive authority around the world. John B. Attanasio,
Rapporteur’s Overview and Conclusions: Of Sovereignty, Globalization, and Courts, 28
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 16 (1995) (noting that the ECtHR “may be becoming a sort of
world court of human rights”); see also Liptak, supra (“These days, foreign courts in
developed democracies often cite the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in cases
concerning equality, liberty and prohibitions against cruel treatment, said Harold Hongju Koh,
the Dean of the Yale Law School.”).
226. For some recent examples of scholarship using these jurisdictions as case studies, see
generally Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative
Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1 (2016); Robert Leckey, The Harms of Remedial Discretion, 14
INT’L J. CONST. L. 584 (2016).
227. Some commentators believe it is important to look beyond the usual suspects in
selecting case studies in comparative law scholarship. See, e.g., RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE
MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 205–23 (2014).
228. The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal recently discussed the standard of review for
constitutional equality claims in two cases concerning discrimination based on residency
status. See Kong Yunming v. Dir. of Soc. Welfare, [2013] 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 950 (C.F.A.); Fok
Chun Wa v. Hosp. Auth., [2012] 15 H.K.C.F.A.R. 409 (C.F.A.). Courts in Hong Kong have
also elaborated on the constitutional protection of equality through a series of gay rights cases.
See Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung Zigo, [2007] 10 H.K.C.F.A.R. 335 (C.F.A.); Leung T
C William Roy v. Sec’y for Justice, [2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 211 (C.A.); QT v. Dir. of
Immigration, [2016] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 583 (C.F.I.); Leung Chun Kwong v. Sec’y for the Civil
Serv., [2017] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 1132 (C.F.I.).
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Kong’s judiciary.229 Thus, we supplement our analysis of Canada, South
Africa, and the Council of Europe by examining developments in Hong
Kong. This sample of foreign jurisdictions cuts across four continents and
diverse cultural contexts.230
A. The Bridge Between Facial Discrimination
and Disparate Impact
The foreign jurisdictions we studied have all eliminated the gap between
facial discrimination and disparate impact in constitutional law,231 although
they sometimes do so under different terminology. Facial discrimination, for
example, is sometimes referred to as “direct discrimination,” and disparate
impact is sometimes referred to as “indirect discrimination” or “adverse
impact” discrimination.232 The differences in terminology notwithstanding,
all of these jurisdictions have similarly bridged the gap between the two
categories of cases.
Canada led the way in bridging the gap. The text of Canada’s
constitutional provision concerning equality is worded vaguely.233 As such,
it could be interpreted to cover only cases of facial discrimination,234 but the

229. Cf. Tanna Chong, Foreign Firms May Flee If Reforms Go Wrong Way: Top US
Lawyer, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/article/1347760/foreign-firms-may-flee-hong-kong-if-reforms-go-wrong-way-top-us
[https://perma.cc/8J5Q-JETV] (noting that many international law firms choose to work in
Hong Kong because of Hong Kong’s “regulatory schemes and strong, independent courts” but
noting that this preference might change depending on Hong Kong’s growing tension with
mainland China).
230. Some commentators believe cross-cultural convergence on a particular human rights
approach makes that approach especially strong because the convergence suggests that the
approach transcends specific cultural biases. See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, International Consensus
as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 63, 103–04 (2007)
(summarizing literature on cross-cultural convergence as an indication of reasoning free of
cultural bias); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV.
131, 153 (2006) (“As long as the societies allow free debate, the very fact that very different
societies come to the same conclusions increases one’s confidence that the norms are
genuinely universal and transcend merely historical or institutional differences.”).
231. There are examples of cases from these jurisdictions that approach disparate impact
similarly to overt discrimination. See Andrews v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143
(Can.); D.H. v. Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007), http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-83256 [https://perma.cc/7MBS-JAM2]; Leung T C William Roy v. Sec’y
for Justice, [2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 211 (C.A.); City Council v. Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC)
(S. Afr.). These cases will be discussed in greater detail below.
232. See Jonnette Watson Hamilton & Jennifer Koshan, Adverse Impact: The Supreme
Court’s Approach to Adverse Effects Discrimination Under Section 15 of the Charter, 19 REV.
CONST. STUD. 191, 194–98 (2015) (providing a primer on terminology).
233. In Canada, the constitutional right to equality is enshrined in section 15(1) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which states: “Every individual is equal before
and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms § 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
234. Cf. SANDRA FREDMAN, EUR. COMM’N, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND EQUALITY LAWS OF THE US, CANADA, SOUTH AFRICA AND INDIA 49–51
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Supreme Court of Canada rejected that approach.235 The court first
expounded on adverse impact discrimination in 1989 in Andrews v. Law
Society of British Columbia.236 Although the case concerned overt
discrimination against bar applicants based on nationality, the court took this
case as an opportunity to speak about equality more generally.237 It stated:
“The ‘similarly situated should be similarly treated’ approach will not
necessarily result in equality nor will every distinction or differentiation in
treatment necessarily result in inequality.”238 It further noted that
“[d]iscrimination is a distinction which, whether intentional or not[,] . . . has
an effect which imposes disadvantages not imposed upon others or which
withholds or limits access to advantages available to other members of
society.”239
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court of Canada relied on Andrews to
strike down facially neutral laws because of their discriminatory effects.240
For example, in Eldridge v. British Columbia,241 the court acknowledged that
government health-care providers were, as a formal matter, not treating
anyone differently by refusing to provide sign-language interpreters.242 The
court concluded, however, that the policy’s adverse impact on deaf persons
was unconstitutional discrimination regardless of whether the policy
involved invidious intent.243 The Canadian court’s decision not to
distinguish between facial discrimination and disparate impact was a
philosophical decision not dictated by Canada’s constitutional text, which
refers to equality only in vague terms.244 The Supreme Court of Canada
reasoned from a philosophical perspective that, in order for constitutional
protection of equality to be meaningful, it must focus on “substantive”
equality by examining laws’ effects on people’s lived experiences.245
Accordingly, the court must scrutinize laws that disadvantage people based
on protected grounds,246 regardless of whether discrimination is intentional,
(2012) (explaining that most constitutions, including Canada’s, do not elaborate on the
meaning of equality and discrimination).
235. See Andrews, 1 S.C.R. at 145.
236. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.).
237. See id. at 145.
238. Id. at 168.
239. Id. at 174 (emphasis added).
240. See generally Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (Can.) (holding that an
antidiscrimination statute that omitted sexual orientation as a protected category was
unconstitutional because of its discriminatory effects); Eldridge v. British Columbia, [1997] 3
S.C.R. 624 (Can.) (concluding that a government health care program created an
unconstitutional adverse impact based on disability).
241. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (Can.).
242. Id. at 626.
243. Id. at 629.
244. See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
245. Eldridge, 3 S.C.R. at 627–29.
246. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms lists the following protected grounds:
“race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). Through case law, the Supreme Court of
Canada has extended protection to “analogous” grounds. See Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1
S.C.R. 493, 495 (Can.) (treating sexual orientation as a protected ground).
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because indirect discrimination inflicts injuries that are comparable to the
injuries of intentional discrimination.247
Inspired by the Canadian experience, South Africa has also bridged the gap
between overt discrimination and discriminatory impact.248 The South
African constitution’s Equality Clause explicitly provides that state and
private actors “may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly.”249 After
South Africa’s Apartheid, equality was a core concern shared by the drafters
of both South Africa’s current constitution as well as the interim constitution
put into place immediately after Apartheid.250 Their constitution’s explicit
reference to indirect discrimination was intended to ensure comprehensive
protections against discrimination.251
The Constitutional Court of South Africa elaborated on the prohibition of
indirect discrimination in the seminal case of City Council v. Walker.252
There, the plaintiff challenged the city of Pretoria’s public-utility policies,
which varied by neighborhood.253 The Court held that the city violated the
constitutional protection of equality by selectively taking legal action against
nonpaying residents of a predominantly white neighborhood.254 Although
this enforcement policy was based on geography, and therefore was
technically race neutral, it indirectly discriminated based on race.255 Writing
for the majority, Justice Pius Langa stated that the constitution “recognises
that conduct which may appear to be neutral and non-discriminatory may
nonetheless result in discrimination”256 and that “[t]o ignore the racial impact
of the [geographic] differentiation is to place form above substance.”257
Furthermore, he concluded that proof of discriminatory intent was not
required for the court to find the indirect discrimination unconstitutional.258
Like the Supreme Court of Canada and the Constitutional Court of South
Africa, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has also recognized
that a facially neutral law can be deemed impermissible regardless of whether

247. See Hamilton & Koshan, supra note 232, at 196–97 (summarizing Supreme Court of
Canada case law that discusses the similarities between direct and indirect discrimination).
248. See Arthur Chaskalson, Brown v. Board of Education: Fifty Years Later, 36 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 503, 510–11 (2005) (noting that South Africa’s approach to adverse impact
cases has been inspired by the experiences of Canada and the European Court of Justice).
249. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 2, § 9 (emphasis added). The interim constitution also
explicitly barred unfair discrimination, direct or indirect. See S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993
ch. 3, § 8.
250. See RICHARD SPITZ & MATTHEW CHASKALSON, THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION: A
HIDDEN HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA’S NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT 301 (2000); Catherine
Albertyn & Janet Kentridge, Introducing the Right to Equality in the Interim Constitution, 10
S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 149, 149 (1994).
251. See SPITZ & CHASKALSON, supra note 250, at 303; Albertyn & Kentridge, supra note
250, at 166–67.
252. City Council v. Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC) (S. Afr.).
253. Id. paras. 5–6.
254. Id. para. 91.
255. Id. para. 32.
256. Id. para. 31.
257. Id. para. 33.
258. Id. para. 43.
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the law was motivated by invidious intent.259 Although the text of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) addresses discrimination, it
neither defines “discrimination” nor specifically mentions indirect
discrimination.260 Over a series of cases, however, the ECtHR has clarified
that indirect discrimination can violate the ECHR regardless of whether the
law stemmed from invidious intentions.261 For example, in Hoogendijk v.
Netherlands,262 a facially neutral income requirement for disability benefits
was found to burden women disproportionately.263 The court stated, “where
a general policy or measure has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a
particular group, it is not excluded that this may be regarded as
discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed or directed at
that group.”264 According to Hoogendijk, where an applicant is able to make
a prima facie case of adverse effect, the respondent state actor bears the
burden of justifying that effect.265 The ECtHR ultimately found that the
disparate impact in Hoogendijk was justified.266
The ECtHR later extended Hoogendijk’s reasoning to race in D.H. v. Czech
Republic.267 In this case, the ECtHR found that the Czech government’s
disproportionate assignment of Roma children to special education programs
was a form of indirect discrimination that violated the ECHR.268 Once the
claimants in D.H. proved a discriminatory effect based on the numbers of
Roma children in special-education schools, the burden shifted to the
government to justify the discrimination pursuant to the same standard of
review that the ECtHR applies to direct racial and ethnic discrimination.269
259. See infra notes 263–72 and accompanying text.
260. Article 14 of the ECHR states, “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with
a national minority, property, birth or other status.” The Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 14, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. Article 1
of the ECHR’s Protocol No. 12 states, “The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status.” Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 2000, E.T.S. 177.
261. See infra notes 261–71 and accompanying text.
262. App. No. 58641/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005), http://echr.ketse.com/doc/58641.00-en20050106/view/ [https://perma.cc/R66H-K6XT].
263. Id. at 21–22.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. D.H. v. Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007), http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-83256 [https://perma.cc/7MBS-JAM2]; see also OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER,
EUR. COMM’N, THE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION UNDER EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
29 (2011) (discussing the relationship between D.H. and Hoogendijk).
268. D.H., App. No. 57325/00 paras. 187–95.
269. With respect to both direct and indirect racial discrimination, the ECtHR asks whether
the government policy under review has a “legitimate aim” and whether there is a “reasonable
relationship of proportionality” between the law and that aim. Id. paras. 195–96, 208. Many
commentators have recognized D.H. as a landmark case because it made clear the ECtHR’s
view that disparate impact could constitute impermissible discrimination regardless of whether
there is discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Rory O’Connell, Substantive Equality in the European

2017]

EQUAL PROTECTION & GLOBAL CONVERGENCE

1283

The ECtHR reiterated that it did not require any finding of discriminatory
intent.270 ECtHR cases after D.H. have confirmed that the gap between overt
discrimination and disparate impact has closed.271 In bridging this gap, D.H.
cited legal developments across Europe and at the United Nations as
persuasive authority to show growing recognition that direct and indirect
discrimination are similarly injurious.272
Finally, in the sodomy case of Leung v. Secretary for Justice,273 the Hong
Kong High Court of Appeal demonstrated that Hong Kong’s constitutional
law protects people against both direct and indirect discrimination.274 This
case concerned a criminal provision that set the age of consent for sodomy
higher than the age of consent for vaginal intercourse.275 The penalty for
violating the age requirement for sodomy was also much more severe.276 The
government argued that the disparate age-of-consent laws did not
discriminate based on sexual orientation because the harsher regulation of
sodomy applied to both same-sex couples and different-sex couples who
engage in sodomy.277 The Court rejected this contention.278 It reasoned that
harsher regulation of sodomy does in fact discriminate based on sexual

Court of Human Rights?, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 129, 131 (2009); Julie Suk,
Disparate Impact Abroad, in A NATION OF WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES?: THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT AT 50, at 283, 294 (Ellen D. Katz & Samuel R. Bagenstos eds., 2015).
270. D.H., App. No. 57325/00 paras. 184, 194.
271. See Lavida v. Greece, App. No. 7973/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-120188 [https://perma.cc/4MZN-KQVD] (examining a facially neutral policy
that disproportionately impacted Roma schoolchildren); Horvath & Kiss v. Hungary, App. No.
11146/11
(Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-116124
[https://perma.cc/M5S7-UD4P] (same).
272. The ECtHR cited nonbinding authority from other branches of the Council of Europe,
the Court of Justice of the European Community (now the European Court of Justice), and
member states’ domestic legal developments. See D.H., App. No. 57325/00, pts. III–VI.
Interestingly, the court also cited United States’ statutory ban on employment discrimination.
Id. para. 107. As discussed above, the United States handles disparate impact cases very
differently in constitutional law as opposed to cases involving statutory protections against
discrimination. See supra note 11.
273. [2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 211 (C.A.).
274. While Hong Kong’s statutory bans on discrimination explicitly bar indirect
discrimination, Hong Kong’s constitutional texts (i.e., the Basic Law and Bill of Rights
Ordinance) do not expressly address indirect discrimination. Carole J. Petersen, Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity in Hong Kong: A Case for the Strategic Use of Human Rights
Treaties and the International Reporting Process, 14 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 28, 46–51
(2013). In the case of Leung, however, the judiciary interpreted constitutional law to prohibit
indirect discrimination as well. Leung, 4 H.K.L.R.D. paras 134–35. According to one
commentator, Leung’s conceptualization of indirect discrimination is more capacious than that
in Hong Kong’s statutory antidiscrimination laws. See Petersen, supra, at 50 n.128.
275. The age of consent for “buggery” (i.e., sodomy) between men was twenty-one. Leung,
4 H.K.L.R.D. para. 6. A parallel provision criminalized buggery between different-sex
partners with a female under twenty-one. Id. Interestingly, the parallel provision on
heterosexual buggery did not stipulate any age of consent for the male partner. See id.
Meanwhile, the age of consent for vaginal sex was sixteen. Id. para. 9.
276. See id. paras. 6–9 (noting that violating the age of consent for sodomy could result in
life imprisonment, whereas violating the age consent for vaginal sex was only punishable by
imprisonment up to five years).
277. Id. para. 48.
278. Id.
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orientation because it “significantly affects homosexual men in an adverse
way compared with heterosexuals. The impact on the former group is
significantly greater than on the latter.”279
From the U.S. perspective, it is noteworthy that Leung did not require a
finding of invidious intent to determine that the disparate impact in that case
constituted sexual-orientation discrimination.280 It came to this conclusion
even though, like the U.S. Constitution, the equality provision in the Hong
Kong bill of rights does not expressly state that indirect discrimination is
impermissible.281 Once the court found there to be sexual-orientation
discrimination, it applied the same rigorous review that it would have applied
to direct discrimination.282 Leung has helped to shape Hong Kong’s legal
landscape beyond sexual-orientation discrimination cases. As explained by
Carole Petersen, an expert on Hong Kong’s equality laws, “This [case] was
highly significant, not only for gay men, but also for others who may seek to
rely upon the concept of indirect discrimination when challenging statutes
and government policies that apply to all, but have a disproportionate and
adverse affect [sic] on one group.”283
Recently, in Leung Chun Kwong v. Secretary for the Civil Service,284 the
High Court’s Court of First Instance reiterated that “equality provisions in
the Basic Law and Hong Kong Bill of Rights could be violated by either
direct or indirect discrimination.”285 The court found that the government’s
provision of spousal benefits for civil servants indirectly discriminated based
on sexual orientation.286 Even though the government policy was neutral on
its face, it created an adverse impact based on sexual orientation because the
Hong Kong government did not recognize same-sex spouses.287 The Court
ultimately found the discrimination to be unconstitutional.288
The preceding examples illustrate that, in bridging the gap between facial
discrimination and disparate impact, the United States is converging with
Canada, South Africa, the Council of Europe, and Hong Kong. In these
foreign jurisdictions, courts made the normative decision to treat direct and
indirect discrimination similarly because the two types of discrimination
harm people in comparable ways. The Canadian constitution, the ECHR, and
279. Id.
280. See id.
281. The Hong King Bill of Rights Ordinance states:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, No. 59, (1991) 1 O.H.K., § 22.
282. See Leung, 4 H.K.L.R.D. paras. 44–51 (applying the court’s standard proportionality
test).
283. Petersen, supra note 274, at 50.
284. [2017] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 1132 (C.F.I.).
285. Id. para. 57.
286. Id. para. 58.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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Hong Kong’s bill of rights do not expressly address indirect
discrimination.289 Nonetheless, the courts interpreting these texts have
decided that facial discrimination and disparate impact must be addressed
similarly.290 While the South African constitution expressly protects people
against indirect discrimination, the Constitutional Court of South Africa
elaborated on indirect discrimination by clarifying that discriminatory motive
need not underlie indirect discrimination for it be impermissible.291 Like
these courts abroad, the Supreme Court must interpret an equal protection
clause that is textually vague. In doing so, the Court seems to be blurring the
distinction between facial discrimination and disparate impact, as courts
abroad already have.
B. Unitary Standards of Review
The U.S. Supreme Court is also converging with foreign courts by
collapsing its standards of review in equal protection cases. The jurisdictions
that we studied all apply a unitary standard to a wide range of discrimination
cases, including cases based on race, sex, and sexual orientation.292 Viewing
these jurisdictions from a higher level of abstraction, they arguably apply two
standards of review: one standard to discrimination based on personal traits
such as race, sex, and sexual orientation293 and another to discrimination
based on characteristics that courts have not considered to be deeply personal,
such as differential treatment of military units or differential treatment based
on residential location.294 Our focus here is on the former category of cases.
As a de jure matter, the Supreme Court applies different tiers of review to
discrimination cases in this first category.295 As a de facto matter, the United
States is beginning to collapse its tiered framework into a unitary standard,
while the foreign jurisdictions studied above already apply a unitary
standard.296 The foreign jurisdictions discussed all refer to this unitary
standard of review as a “proportionality analysis,” but that analysis manifests
differently across jurisdictions.297

289. See supra notes 246, 249, 260 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 246, 249, 260 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 252–58 and accompanying text.
292. We highlight foreign approaches to race, sex, and sexual orientation because cases
concerning these statuses have become paradigmatic examples of tiered review in the United
States. See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text.
293. See infra notes 310, 315–17, 327, 332 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., Kong Yunming v. Dir. of Soc. Welfare, [2013] 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 950
(C.F.A.) (addressing discrimination based on residency status); Beian v. Romania, App. No.
30658/05
(Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
2007),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-83822
[https://perma.cc/PM2E-ADJQ] (addressing differential treatment of military units).
295. See supra note 143–144 and accompanying text.
296. See supra Part II.B.
297. Commentators often trace these jurisdictions’ proportionality analysis to German
roots. Germany first developed proportionality analysis as a component of administrative law.
Proportionality doctrine has since expanded to other doctrinal areas, including constitutional
rights, and to other countries including the ones that this Article studies. For background on
the German roots of proportionality doctrines, see Moshe Cohen-Aliya & Iddo Porat,
American Balancing and German Proportionality: The Historic Origins, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L.
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In Canadian constitutional law, section 1 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms makes clear that constitutional rights are not
absolute.298 In the seminal case of R. v. Oakes,299 the Supreme Court of
Canada developed the proportionality analysis that it uses in most cases to
determine whether a rights infringement is justified.300 Oakes itself was not
an equality case, but the court has since extended the Oakes test to equality
jurisprudence.301
In equality cases, the Supreme Court of Canada will first ask whether the
state has discriminated—either directly or indirectly—based on protected
grounds.302 If there is discrimination, the court will evaluate whether the
discrimination can be justified.303 In accordance with Oakes, the
discriminatory measure can be justified only if it is proportionally related to
achieving a “pressing and substantial” government objective.304 To satisfy
the proportionality requirement, (1) the discriminatory measure must be
rationally connected to the government objective, (2) it should impair
protected rights as little as possible, and (3) there must be proportionality
between the deleterious effects of the discriminatory measure and the
The court will analyze each of these steps
objective served.305
sequentially.306 The third step of this analysis requires the court to consider
how harmful the discrimination is.307 If the government deprives people of
263, 263 (2010); Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 98–111 (2008).
298. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 1, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K) (“The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”).
299. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
300. Although the Supreme Court of Canada uses the Oakes test to analyze most disputes
about constitutional rights, there are some contexts in which the Oakes test does not apply.
See generally Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 (Can.) (declining to apply the
Oakes test to administrative law); R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 (Can.) (applying an analysis
other than the Oakes test to a particular criminal context).
301. See generally Trociuk v. British Columbia (Att’y Gen.), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835 (Can.)
(striking down a law that excluded a father’s information from his child’s birth registration);
Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (Can.) (striking down Alberta’s Individual Rights
Protection Act for excluding sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination).
302. See Andrews v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 153–54 (Can.). Canada has
recognized numerous protected grounds and subjects all of these grounds to the same analysis
rather than different tiers of analysis. In Canadian constitutional law, protected grounds of
discrimination include race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability, sexual orientation, citizenship, marital status, and off-reserve aboriginal
status. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). For background on how these
grounds were identified, see infra note 312 and accompanying text.
303. Andrews, 1 S.C.R. at 153–54.
304. See id. at 153.
305. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 105–06 (Can.); see also Reference re Pub. Serv.
Emp. Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 373–74 (Can.) (restating the Oakes test). For
further discussion on applying the Oakes test to equality cases, see Fredman, supra note 234,
at 72–73.
306. See Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 105.
307. This third step is sometimes referred to as evaluating “proportionality in the strict
sense” or “proportionality in the narrow sense.” Sweet & Mathews, supra note 297, at 75, 105.
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a particularly important right or benefit, the discrimination is especially
harmful.308 Accordingly, the government will need to show that a
correspondingly strong objective is being served by the discrimination.309
Canadian courts apply the Oakes test to all protected categories of
discrimination, including race, sex, and sexual orientation.310 The Charter
on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms explicitly enumerates certain protected
grounds of discrimination: “race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability.”311 In addition, the Canadian
Supreme Court has identified sexual orientation, citizenship, marital status,
and off-reserve aboriginal status as additional protected grounds.312
Canadian constitutional law applies the Oakes test to all these different
categories.313
South Africa also eschews tiered review for a unitary proportionality
analysis.314 The South African Constitutional Court has applied the same
proportionality test to cases of race discrimination,315 sex discrimination,316
and sexual-orientation discrimination.317 These categories of discrimination
are among the sixteen categories explicitly protected by the South African
constitution.318 The constitutional court has also expanded the list of

For a discussion on the importance of this step, see id. at 75–76. Sometimes commentators
refer to this step as the fourth (as opposed to third) step in analysis because they count
identification of a pressing and substantial government objective as the first step of analysis.
See id.
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. See, e.g., Bear v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 3 F.C. 456 (Can.) (striking down
an act that prohibited Indians from participating in a universal pension plan); M. v. H., [1999]
2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.) (striking down legal provisions that barred same-sex couples’ access to
spousal support); Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358 (Can.) (striking
down immigration regulations that discriminated against fathers because of sex stereotypes);.
311. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
312. The Supreme Court of Canada refers to these protected grounds as “analogous”
protected grounds, as opposed to “enumerated” protected grounds. See generally Corbiere v.
Canada (Minister of Indian and N. Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 (Can.) (off-reserve aboriginal
status); Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (Can.) (sexual orientation); Miron v. Trudel,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 (Can.) (marital status); Andrews v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R.
143 (Can.) (citizenship). A common theme among the enumerated and analogous grounds of
protection is that “they often serve as the basis for stereotypical decisions made not on the
basis of merit but on the basis of a personal characteristic that is immutable or changeable only
at unacceptable cost to personal identity.” Corbiere, 2 S.C.R. at 206.
313. See Fredman, supra note 234, at 72–73; supra note 301 and accompanying text.
314. See Fredman, supra note 234, at 35–36.
315. City Council v. Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC) (S. Afr.) para. 81 (holding that a
policy of selective enforcement of debt recovery amounted to unfair race discrimination).
316. President v. Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) (S. Afr.) para. 2 (upholding a policy
giving the president authority to grant incarcerated mothers prison sentence remissions).
317. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.) (concluding that
barring same-sex couples from marrying violated constitutional rights to equality and dignity).
318. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 2, § 9 (listing protection categories including race, gender,
sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual orientation, age, disability,
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth).
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protected grounds through case law.319 The proportionality test is a unitary
standard that applies to all of these different categories of discrimination.320
There are differences between Canada’s and South Africa’s
proportionality tests. Unlike the Oakes test, which requires analyzing
proportionality through a series of discrete steps,321 South Africa’s
proportionality test is a “single-stage, multi-factored balancing” exercise.322
The Constitutional Court of South Africa first developed its proportionality
test in a case challenging the death penalty as violating South Africa’s postApartheid interim constitution’s ban on cruel, inhuman, and degrading
punishment.323
Subsequently, South Africa enshrined the constitutional court’s
proportionality test in the “Limitation of Rights” section of the postApartheid final constitution, and the proportionality test now applies to
equality cases.324 The constitution lays out five factors that should be
weighed to determine whether an infringement of equality rights is
justified.325
The European Court of Human Rights has also adopted a proportionality
analysis for equality cases. Discrimination violates article 14 of the ECHR
“if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim
sought to be realised.”326 In analyzing proportionality, the ECtHR will
usually require “very weighty reasons” to justify discrimination on grounds
of race, sex, sexual orientation, nationality, religion, and nonmarital birth.327
319. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. S. African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) (recognizing
discrimination based on HIV status as a protected category).
320. See Fredman, supra note 234, at 35–36.
321. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 105–06 (Can.); Sweet & Mathews, supra note
316, at 117.
322. See Sweet & Mathews, supra note 297, at 127.
323. See S. v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
324. The Constitution of South Africa does not use the term “proportionality,” but it
requires a balancing of five factors in its Limitation of Rights Clause. See S. AFR. CONST.,
1996 ch. 2, § 36.
325. The five factors to be weighed include the nature of the right, the importance of the
purpose of limiting the right, the nature and extent of the limitation, the relation between the
limitation and its purpose, and the existence of less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
Id.
326. Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas v. Austria, App. No. 40825/98 para. 87
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-88022 [https://perma.cc/HJ69S2PC]; see also Belgian Linguistic Case, App. No. 1677/62, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 252 para. 10
(1968) (providing an earlier articulation of the same test).
327. For elaboration on how requiring “very weighty reasons” for these categories of
discrimination differs markedly from the United States’ rigid multitiered approach to
categories of discrimination, see Aaron Baker, Proportional, Not Strict, Scrutiny: Against a
U.S. “Suspect Classifications” Model Under Article 14 ECHR in the U.K., 56 AM. J. COMP.
L. 847, 888–89 (2008). For further background on the “very weighty reasons” requirement,
see Rory O’Connell, Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Art. 14 and the Right to NonDiscrimination in the ECHR, 29 LEGAL STUD. 211, 214 (2009). For a case acknowledging
that “very weighty reasons” are required to justify differential treatment based on religion, sex,
sexual orientation, birth status, and nationality, see Vojnity v. Hungary, App. No. 29617/07
para.
36
(Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-116409
[https://perma.cc/N7JG-98KM].
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The ECtHR has also identified additional factors for calibrating the
proportionality analysis. For example, it will defer more to state
governments through its doctrine of “margin of appreciation” if the
challenged law deals primarily with economic policy.328 The ECtHR will
also defer more to state governments if the legal challenge concerns an area
of policy-making about which there is little sign of consensus among
European states.329 For the purposes of this Article’s comparisons with the
United States, it is worth underscoring the fact that the ECtHR applies the
same proportionality analysis to discrimination based on different personal
traits including race, sex, or sexual orientation.330
Hong Kong also applies a unitary standard of review for constitutional
equality cases concerning personal characteristics. In Secretary for Justice
v. Yau,331 which addressed disparate criminalization of public sex based on
sexual orientation, Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal stated that
discrimination based on race, sex, and sexual orientation are all subject to the
same proportionality analysis, which requires “intense scrutiny” of
discrimination.332 Bearing some similarity to the Canadian test discussed
above, the proportionality test in Yau dictates that, in order for discrimination
to be justified, the difference in treatment must (1) “pursue a legitimate aim”;
(2) “be rationally connected to the legitimate aim”; and (3) “be no more than
is necessary to accomplish the legitimate aim.”333 The court subsequently
clarified that this proportionality review extends to discrimination based on
other personal characteristics as well, such as religion, politics, and social
328. See, e.g., Stec v. United Kingdom, App. No. 65731/01 para. 52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2006),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-73198 [https://perma.cc/Q78P-VYV6] (stating that state
policies concerning macroeconomics, including social security policies, warrant deference
through the margin of appreciation doctrine). See generally HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE
MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS
JURISPRUDENCE (1996).
329. See, e.g., Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04 para. 105 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-99605 [https://perma.cc/7AKP-SHPJ] (adjusting the
court’s analysis of sexual-orientation discrimination based on the lack of consensus
concerning same-sex marriage); see also Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and
the Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J.
1730, 1734–45 (2011); Holning Lau, Comparative Perspectives on Strategic Remedial
Delays, 91 TUL. L. REV. 259, 271–72, 312–15 (2016).
330. See Baker, supra note 327, at 888–89 (contrasting the ECtHR’s proportionality
analysis with traditional tiered review in the United States). Although the ECtHR applies the
same proportionality analysis to different personal traits, the court’s deference to states
through its consensus doctrine may end up ratcheting down the intensity of review for personal
traits that are arguably more controversial, such as sexual orientation. For example, even
though the ECtHR has said that it usually requires “very weighty reasons” to justify sexual
orientation discrimination, this demand for rigorous review has been countered by the court’s
deference to states on the issue of same-sex marriage due to the lack of European consensus
on same-sex marriage. See Chapin & Charpentier v. France, App. No. 40183/07 para. 51 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-163436 [https://perma.cc/C2MG-UVA8]
(reiterating the holding from Schalk & Kopf because there was still no consensus regarding
same-sex marriage); Schalk & Kopf, App. No. 30141/04 para. 105 (holding that the ECtHR’s
protection of equality does not require states to allow same-sex marriage).
331. Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung Zigo, [2007] 10 H.K.C.F.A.R. 335 (C.F.A.).
332. Id. paras. 20–21.
333. Id. para. 20.
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origin.334 It stated, however, that a less rigorous standard of review would
apply to differential treatment based on factors that it did not consider
personal characteristics, such as the location of one’s residency.335
In sum, the four jurisdictions we studied all apply a single standard of
review—a unitary proportionality analysis—to cases concerning
discrimination based on personal characteristics. These jurisdictions have
been aware that the United States’ multitiered system exists as an alternative
approach, but they have chosen a unitary and flexible proportionality analysis
instead.336 Consider, for example, a speech that Canadian Chief Justice
Beverley McLachlin delivered at a judicial colloquium at the Hong Kong
Court of Final Appeal in 2015.337 Chief Justice McLachlin directly
contrasted Canada’s approach to constitutional law with that of the United
States, which relies more on rigid categories.338 In U.S. equal protection
cases, this means separating different types of discrimination by category and
applying a different legal test to each category.339
Chief Justice McLachlin acknowledged that proponents of the United
States’ approach believe that the U.S approach “offers more certainty and
provides less scope for judicial law-making.”340 She argued, however, that

334. Fok Chun Wa v. Hosp. Auth., [2012] 15 H.K.C.F.A.R. 409 para. 5 (C.F.A.) (drawing
a distinction between discrimination based on “core-values, including those relating to
personal or human characteristics such as race, colour, gender, sexual orientation, religion,
politics or social origin” and discrimination based on other grounds including residency status,
which was at issue in the instant case).
335. See id.; Kong Yunming v. Dir. of Soc. Welfare, [2013] 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 950 paras.
40–41 (C.F.A.). It is worth noting that, in 2016, the Court of Final Appeal modified its
proportionality test in the context of protecting constitutional property rights. See Hysan Dev.
Co. v. Town Planning Bd., [2016] 19 H.K.C.F.A.R. 372 paras. 64–88 (C.F.A.). The Court of
Final Appeal added an additional step to proportionality analysis, so the test now operates even
more similarly to the Canadian Oakes test. Id. Whether Hong Kong courts will apply this
revised proportionality test to equality cases is yet to be seen. In at least one case, the Court
of First Instance has signaled that the modified test in Hysan should be applied in equality
cases. See Leung Chun Kwong v. Sec’y for the Civil Serv., [2017] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 1132 para.
36 (C.F.I.). But see Kelley Loper, Constitutional Adjudication and Substantive Gender
Equality in Hong Kong, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 149, 157–
58 (Beverley Baines et al. eds., 2012) (contending that, in Hong Kong, the doctrinal test for
justifying differential treatment might differ from proportionality tests with respect to
infringement of other constitutional rights).
336. Indeed, the jurisdictions that we studied regularly cite U.S. precedent, but they have
chosen not to adopt the United States’ tiered approach to equal protection. Cf. Liptak, supra
note 225 (noting that courts around the world have looked to the U.S. Supreme Court for
inspiration, but have become, over time, less influenced by U.S. jurisprudence).
337. See Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Can., Address at the
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Judicial Colloquium 2015: Proportionality, Justification,
Evidence and Deference: Perspectives from Canada (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.hkcfa.hk/
en/documents/publications/speeches_articles/index.html [https://perma.cc/9KUU-DTB5].
338. See id. at 10–11.
339. For background on this U.S. approach, see supra Part I.B. Outside the equal protection
context, some other components of U.S. constitutional doctrine involve even stricter
categorical tests. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (using a
bright-line rule to define incitement of imminent unlawful action as a category of speech
unprotected by the First Amendment).
340. McLachlin, supra note 337, at 10.
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“these advantages may be more apparent than real.”341 Although Chief
Justice McLachlin was speaking about U.S. constitutional law in general, her
critique seems especially apt with respect to equal protection.342 As
discussed in Part II.B, the United States’ tiered approach has failed to cabin
judicial discretion in ways that would render constitutional law more
predictable and certain.343 The Canadian approach embodied in the Oakes
test gives judges more room to weigh competing interests on a case-by-case
basis and prompts judges to be open and honest about what they are doing.344
Chief Justice McLachlin explained that Canada’s flexible proportionality
analysis “fosters transparency, accountability and trust.”345 Like Canada, the
other three foreign jurisdictions discussed have also opted for a unitary
proportionality analysis.
III. THE PATH AHEAD
Our discussion thus far has been primarily descriptive. We have mapped
two trajectories in U.S. equal protection doctrine and illustrated these
trajectories’ convergence with foreign law. In this Part, we turn to the
prescriptive question: What should be the significance of these developments
going forward? We contend that, in future equal protection cases, the U.S.
Supreme Court should engage foreign law much more directly and
transparently. Doing so should encourage the United States to continue
bridging the gap between facial discrimination and disparate impact and to
continue collapsing tiered review. Foreign law should also inform the United
States as it deliberates further about the standard of review that should replace
tiered review.
This Part then draws on theoretical literature about judicial decisionmaking to develop three arguments about engaging foreign law in future
equal protection jurisprudence. We refer to these three claims as (1)
promoting judicial candor, (2) leveraging collective wisdom, and (3) learning
from foreign jurisdictions as laboratories of doctrinal innovation. We will
also address counterarguments that criticize judicial consideration of foreign
law.
A. Judicial Candor
The current trajectories in U.S. law might already be informed by Supreme
Court Justices’ appreciation of foreign developments. It is possible that
foreign law has inspired and influenced Supreme Court Justices, but that they

341. Id.
342. See id. at 10–11.
343. See supra notes 149–68 and accompanying text.
344. For our earlier discussion on the Oakes test’s sequence of steps, see supra notes 300–
13 and accompanying text.
345. McLachlin, supra note 337, at 14; see also DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE
OF LAW 159–88 (2004) (praising Oakes’s structured proportionality test); Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3113–14 (2015) (same).
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are choosing to omit explicit references to foreign law.346 Over a decade ago,
the Supreme Court did overtly cite foreign law in some high-profile
constitutional cases.347 For example, to support striking down Texas’s ban
on same-sex sodomy in Lawrence, the Court cited the ECtHR, laws of United
Kingdom, and an amicus brief surveying laws worldwide.348 Likewise, in
Roper v. Simmons,349 the Court cited legal developments around the world to
support striking down the juvenile death penalty.350 These references to
foreign law unleashed strong responses from critics, including dissenting
Justices, who believed that foreign law should never be consulted in
constitutional adjudication.351 Perhaps this criticism has made Justices shy
about openly referencing foreign law. Some Justices may continue to be
inspired and influenced by foreign law, but they may choose to obscure those
sources by not citing them.352
Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that Justices continue to be well
aware of foreign constitutional doctrine. First, in constitutional cases over
the past decade, the Justices have frequently received amicus briefs that
present arguments based on foreign law.353 Second, Justices often spend time
speaking with foreign jurists at international events, such as conferences and
summer teaching collaborations.354 Third, some Justices have openly
supported learning from foreign jurisdictions. For example, in public

346. For example, Obergefell comports with the doctrinal trends that this Article discusses,
but it does not cite any foreign law. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015).
347. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
573 (2003).
348. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573, 576.
349. 543 U.S. 551 (2015).
350. See id. at 575–77.
351. See, e.g., id. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that foreign and international law
have no place in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence); Robert H. Bork, Has the Supreme Court
Gone Too Far?, COMMENTARY, Oct. 2003, at 32 (calling the Supreme Court’s citation to
foreign law “absurd” and “flabbergasting.”); Robert H. Bork, Whose Constitution Is It,
Anyway?, NAT’L REV., Dec. 8, 2003, at 37 [hereinafter Bork, Whose Constitution].
352. At least one law review article has cited anonymous federal judges saying that they
consciously avoid citing international law to avoid blowback. John Coyle, The Case for
Writing International Law into the U.S. Code, 56 B.C. L. REV. 433, 476 n.220 (2015).
353. See, e.g., Brief for 54 International and Comparative Law Experts from 27 Countries
and the Marriage and Family Law Research Project as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 1, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574)
(citing jurisprudence from South Africa, Canada, the ECtHR, and others); Brief for Foreign
and Comparative Law Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Obergefell, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574) (citing jurisprudence from Canada, the
Council of Europe, Hong Kong, South Africa, and other parts of the world).
354. See, ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–100 (2004) (discussing
networking among constitutional court judges around the world); David Fontana, Refined
Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 548–49 (2001) (noting that U.S.
Supreme Court Justices “confer with members of constitutional courts in other countries [at
conferences and other meetings] and have spoken of the need to incorporate comparative
constitutional law into American constitutional law” (footnote omitted)).
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speeches, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg have both spoken in favor of learning
from foreign law.355
If Justices are in fact inspired by foreign jurisprudence, they should be
frank about it. They should not obscure what they are doing by omitting
citations to foreign law. By and large, commentators have recognized the
importance of judicial candor.356 Judicial candor is important to the principle
of publicity, which entails providing explanations to the public.357 The
public is entitled to know the background of judicial decisions to facilitate
discussions and debates about the merits of the decisions.358 The Court
should therefore transparently defend drawing inspiration from abroad. As
discussed in Parts III.B and C, there are principled reasons for drawing on
foreign law specifically in the context of equal protection.
Judicial candor is important not only to facilitate public debate, but also
because candor is essential to trust and institutional integrity. Judicial
transparency about reasoning and sources of law establishes a “background
norm of truthfulness” that is essential to upholding the integrity of the
judiciary.359 If we do not expect judicial candor when it comes to drawing
from foreign laws, there could be a slippery slope, whereby judges feel they
can distort their motivations in other ways to achieve their desired results.
Such distortions would further undermine judicial integrity.360
To be sure, commentators have recognized some exceptional
circumstances under which judicial candor should not be expected.361 For
example, if being candid about judicial reasoning would somehow undermine
national security or cause extreme backlash that threatens the judiciary’s
independence, candor should not be expected.362 Such severe threats,
however, are generally not at issue when it comes to being candid about citing
foreign law.
Of course, while we speculate that sitting Justices have drawn some
inspiration from abroad in developing recent U.S. jurisprudence that
converges with foreign law, we must emphasize that we do not know if this
is in fact the case. To the extent that the Justices have been drawing

355. See Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares Views on Influence of Foreign Law on Her Court,
and Vice Versa, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/us/
12ginsburg.html [https://perma.cc/GWJ4-8YVP]; David G. Savage, A Justice’s International
View,
L.A. TIMES
(June
14,
2008),
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/14/
nation/na-scotus14 [https://perma.cc/X6U4-F2AB] (discussing Justice Kennedy’s support of
international law); see also Fontana, supra note 354, at 548 (noting Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor’s public statements in favor of learning from foreign law).
356. See, e.g., Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative
Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1, 62 (2016); Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 NW.
U. L. REV. 721, 721 (1979); Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s
Use of Foreign Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637, 674; David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial
Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 731 (1987).
357. Delaney, supra note 356, at 13.
358. Parrish, supra note 356, at 674.
359. Delaney, supra note 356, at 13–14.
360. See Shapiro, supra note 356, at 737.
361. See, e.g., Delaney, supra note 356, at 14–15.
362. See id.
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inspiration from abroad, however, we contend that they should be more
transparent about this influence.
B. Collective Wisdom
Even if the Supreme Court Justices were not influenced by foreign law in
developing the doctrinal trajectories that we discussed, they should engage
with foreign law more directly in the future. One reason for doing so is the
value of collective wisdom. The more that peer jurisdictions approach a
particular question the same way, the more likely that approach will be
correct.363 Jeremy Waldron has referred to this as the “force of numbers”
when he explained reasons the United States should learn from foreign
law.364 Aristotle articulated a version of this claim when he explained that
there are benefits to the “wisdom of multitudes.”365 The same sentiment is
also captured by the old adage “two heads are better than one”366 and the
phrase “wisdom of crowds,” which James Surowiecki popularized to
describe the superiority of aggregated wisdom of a group—even a small
group—over that of individuals.367
To understand why aggregated wisdom is persuasive, one can consider
Waldron’s analogy between law and science.368 If the United States were to
address a difficult public health question, such as an epidemic, it would
certainly look at how other countries have addressed the same epidemic.369
The United States should not simply mimic other countries’ responses
because the epidemic might manifest differently in the United States, but it
would be irresponsible for the United States not to leverage the accumulated
wisdom of foreign countries.370 At the very least, if the United States is
leaning toward a particular approach, it can find reassurance in knowing that
foreign countries have chosen the same approach after examining the
problem from various vantage points.371 Of course, when looking abroad,
the United States should set its sights on trustworthy findings.372 As Waldron
put it, U.S. scientists “would not look to the work of suspect or disreputable
laboratories.”373
363. See JEREMY WALDRON, “PARTLY
IN AMERICAN COURTS 87–89 (2012).

LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND”: FOREIGN LAW

364. Id. at 85.
365. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. 3, chap. 11, ll. 1281a43–b9 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., 1998).
Although Aristotle did not apply his theory of the “wisdom of multitudes” to the context of
courts citing foreign law, Jeremy Waldron has applied Aristotle’s reasoning to that context.
See WALDRON, supra note 363, at 87–89.
366. Lee, supra note 230, at 102.
367. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 173–91 (2004) (discussing the
benefits of collective wisdom in small groups, such as small committees and management
teams).
368. See Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129,
143–45 (2005).
369. Id. at 144.
370. Id.
371. See id.
372. Id. at 145.
373. Id.
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In the equal protection context, Waldron’s analogy is particularly apt.
Many countries face the same generic problem: how to conceptualize
constitutional protections of equality when the relevant constitutional
provisions are textually vague.374 It would make sense for the United States
to learn from the peer jurisdictions that we studied because they are reputable
jurisdictions, known for successfully implementing rule of law and liberal
constitutional regimes.375 In other words, they are not “suspect or
disreputable laboratories.”376 The United States should find reassurance in
the fact that these jurisdictions have reached a consensus about treating
disparate impact like facial discrimination and rejecting tiered scrutiny.377
While the United States has taken the first few steps in bridging facial
discrimination and disparate impact and collapsing tiered scrutiny, the
accumulated wisdom from reputable peer jurisdictions should make the
United States feel more confident about continuing on its current path.378
Foreign experience thus performs a confirmatory function.
The collective wisdom of a group is particularly persuasive when the group
shares relevant similarities.379 Youngjae Lee’s hypothetical “Dignity
Society” helps to elucidate this idea.380 Imagine that we are part of this club
because we place a high value on human dignity, as do all the other members
of the club.381 Indeed, the club consists of like-minded individuals.382 If
other people in the group reach a consensus that conflicts with our own stance
on an issue, that should give us reason to reconsider our own position.383
Likewise, as Youngjae Lee has noted, “if [we are] unsure about a moral issue
that implicates dignity concerns, . . . [we] could come to a tentative
conclusion about the issue and then seek to confirm it with others in the
Society.”384 Furthermore, Lee explained: “We all have experiences of
consulting members of various groups we belong to in order to test our
intuitions about one matter or another. So this is one context in which
‘consensus’ is epistemically significant.”385
While Lee’s hypothetical involves individuals in a club, it is a metaphor
for jurisdictions that belong to a shared school of thought. The United States
374. See David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 705 (2005)
(explaining that “[g]eneric [c]oncerns” give rise to “[g]eneric [d]octrine” in constitutional law
around the world).
375. See supra notes 225, 229 and accompanying text.
376. See Waldron, supra note 368, at 145.
377. See supra note 371 and accompanying text.
378. For elaboration on these developments in U.S. doctrine, see supra Part II.
379. See Lee, supra note 230, at 99. Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein have applied the
Condorcet jury theorem to comparative constitutional law, which suggests that consensus
among foreign jurisdictions is particularly persuasive if three conditions are met, including the
condition that the jurisdictions in agreement are sufficiently similar. Posner & Sunstein, supra
note 230, 136. The two other conditions are that the jurisdictions must not be simply
mimicking each other, and they must base their decisions on private information. Id.
380. See Lee, supra note 230, at 99.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 99–100.
383. Id. at 100.
384. Id.
385. Id.
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is in a club of sorts, to which Canada, South Africa, the Council of Europe,
and Hong Kong also belong. Courts in each of these jurisdictions have placed
great weight on human dignity and liberal constitutionalism.386 Accordingly,
the club’s emerging consensus on equality doctrine should bear
epistemological weight on individual club members, including the United
States.387 To be sure, there are many illiberal jurisdictions around the world
that have not taken equal protection seriously, but “force in numbers” among
those jurisdictions should not be assigned persuasive weight.
We recognize that there is already robust debate within U.S. legal
scholarship about whether to bridge facial discrimination and disparate
impact and collapse the tiers of scrutiny.388 It is beyond this Article’s scope
to fully engage that existing body of literature. Rather, our aim is to fill a gap
in the domestic discourse. Our point is that the collective wisdom of foreign
jurisdictions should be a factor that informs debate within the United States
but that such consideration has been missing.
In sum, collective wisdom of foreign jurisdictions should encourage the
United States to continue along its path of bridging facial discrimination and
disparate impact and collapsing tiered review of discrimination based on
personal characteristics. Like the Supreme Court, courts in peer jurisdictions
have given meaning to concepts such as equality and discrimination, which
are not defined neatly by their respective constitutions (or, in the case of the
European Court of Human Rights, its treaty). The fact that the United States’
recent steps toward doctrinal reform and peer jurisdictions’ approaches to
equality converge should reassure the United States that its emerging
conceptualization of equality is proper.
C. Laboratories for Experimentation
While aggregate wisdom has persuasive value, individual foreign
jurisdictions also provide helpful information. This is because, as Judge
Richard Posner has explained, “Just as our states are laboratories for social
experiments from which other states and the federal government can learn,
so are foreign nations laboratories from whose legal experiments we can

386. See generally Anthony Mason, The Place of Comparative Law in Developing the
Jurisprudence on the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Hong Kong, 37 H.K.L.J. 299 (2007)
(discussing Hong Kong); Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation
of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655 (2008) (discussing the European Court of Human
Rights); Rory O’Connell, The Role of Dignity in Equality Law: Lessons from Canada and
South Africa, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 267 (2008) (discussing Canada and South Africa); Neomi
Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183 (2011)
(discussing the United States, among other jurisdictions).
387. See supra note 385 and accompanying text.
388. See generally Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal
Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059 (2011) (drawing on history from the
Reconstruction era to critique the Court’s jurisprudence on disparate impact and tiered
review); Goldberg, supra note 138 (building on critiques of the tiered approach to equal
protection cases); Johnson, supra note 63 (contributing to the debate concerning the divide
between facial discrimination and disparate impact).
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learn.”389 Sometimes, laboratories replicate each other’s findings, and there
is persuasive value to that aggregate information. We discussed such
aggregate wisdom in the preceding section. Even if laboratories yield
divergent results, we can learn from those results.390
If the United States continues down the path of collapsing tiered review in
equal protection, foreign jurisdictions could serve as a helpful resource
because they have been laboratories for experimentation. In Part I.A, we
explained that, as a de facto matter, the Supreme Court seems to have
collapsed tiered review into four factors that it uses to determine whether
discrimination violates equal protection. We acknowledged, however, that
the jurisprudence has yet to crystalize.391 The Court has never explicitly
articulated a de jure four-part test. Hopefully, the Court will soon offer
clarification by expressly articulating a legal standard to replace tiered
review. In doing so, the Court ought to draw from foreign experiences to
strengthen its reasoning.
Although the four jurisdictions that we studied have all rejected multitiered
review, they have adopted different versions of proportionality analysis in its
place.392 The United States ought to consider the advantages and drawbacks
of these approaches as potential alternatives to the multifactor balancing act
that we see currently emerging.393 As Waldron explained, examining the
experiences of foreign courts help judges in “exploring the options [available
to them], and considering various possible models of analysis.”394 The
United States should not feel pressured to adopt doctrinal innovation from
abroad. However, if the Court considers a range of alternative options and
then explains why it ultimately chooses the doctrinal framework that it does,
such a practice would enhance the Court’s reasoning and transparency.395
It is beyond this Article’s scope to propose any specific standard of review
to replace tiered analysis in the United States. We do, however, wish to offer
a few thoughts about how the United States ought to engage the potential
models developed abroad. The Court should not limit itself to citing foreign
law only if it adopts a foreign doctrinal framework.396 Instead, if the Court
rejects alternative doctrinal frameworks developed abroad, it should explain
that rejection.397 For example, if the United States chooses not to adopt a
389. Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws: The Court Should
Never View a Foreign Legal Decision as a Precedent in Any Way, LEGAL AFF. (July–Aug.
2004), https://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.msp
[https://perma.cc/N2JD-HBW2].
390. See WALDRON, supra note 363, at 76 (noting that opinions from foreign jurisdictions
can be persuasive either individually or collectively).
391. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court is in
the process of transitioning to a new doctrinal framework).
392. See supra Part II.B.
393. See supra notes 169–220.
394. WALDRON, supra note 363, at 80.
395. See id. at 83 (“The transparent citation of reasons for arriving at a decision is one of
the most important aspects of adjudication.”).
396. See VICKI JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 71
(2010) (discussing the value of foreign law as negative or “aversive” authority).
397. See id.
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sequential proportionality analysis such as Canada’s Oakes test, it would be
helpful to hear why.398 Such transparent reasoning would enhance the depth
and persuasiveness of U.S. jurisprudence.
South Africa’s landmark death penalty case, S. v. Makwanyane,399
illustrates the approach to comparative analysis we recommend.400 In
analyzing whether the death penalty should be unconstitutional, the
Constitutional Court of South Africa referenced death penalty jurisprudence
from Botswana, Canada, ECtHR, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, India,
Jamaica, Tanzania, the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the
United States, and Zimbabwe.401 The court’s opinion explained why certain
foreign approaches were not well suited for South Africa.402 In particular,
the court rejected U.S. Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as being
inappropriate for South Africa.403 Makwanyane’s comparative analysis has
been heralded as a model of juridical sophistication.404 The thoroughness of
the court’s analysis enhanced its persuasiveness. Similarly, the United States
could enhance its equal protection jurisprudence by considering foreign
doctrinal frameworks and thoroughly explaining why—or why not—such
foreign developments are suitable for the United States.
D. Addressing Criticisms
Some commentators have adamantly opposed consulting foreign sources
when interpreting the Constitution.405 While it is beyond the scope of this
Article to completely rehash the debate about whether U.S. courts should cite
foreign law, this Part briefly addresses what we perceive to be the three most
common arguments against citing foreign law in constitutional cases. These
critiques center around concerns about (1) originalism, (2) opportunism, and
(3) cultural particularism.
398. See supra notes 299–313 and accompanying text.
399. 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
400. Id. (establishing that capital punishment violates constitutional rights).
401. See id. paras. 35, 40–42, 59–60, 70–79, 83, 100, 105–09, 148.
402. See id. para 77 (distinguishing South Africa from India); id. para. 102 (distinguishing
South Africa from the United States).
403. See id. paras. 90–99 (discussing the significance of differences between the South
African and U.S. constitutions).
404. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Mature Adjudication: Interpretive Choice in Recent
Death Penalty Cases, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 255, 256 (1996) (calling the Makwanyane
opinion’s comparative law analysis “a visionary model of judicial decisionmaking—a model
of ‘mature adjudication’”); Mark S. Kende, The Constitutionality of the Death Penalty: South
Africa as a Model for the United States, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 209, 249 (2006)
(encouraging the Supreme Court to “follow[] in the South African Constitutional Court’s
footsteps” from Makwanyane).
405. Justice Scalia was one of the most vocal opponents of citing foreign law. See Jimmy
Hoover, Scalia Sears Supreme Court for Foreign Law References, LAW360 (May 29, 2015),
https://www.law360.com/articles/661690/scalia-sears-supreme-court-for-foreign-lawreferences [https://perma.cc/5M53-H7KB] (reporting Justice Scalia’s remarks against citing
foreign law during a speech at George Mason University School of Law); see also Harlan
Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of the U.S. Supreme Court,
24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273, 273 (2006) (quoting legislators who have spoken out against
citing foreign law).
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Some commentators oppose citing foreign law because they believe doing
Other commentators, however, have
so undermines originalism.406
demonstrated that it is not at all clear that the framers of the Constitution
would have opposed subsequent generations of Americans referring to
foreign law for inspiration.407 With regard to equal protection, specifically,
original meaning is elusive and renders originalism indeterminate.408 Indeed,
some legal historians have argued that the framers and the public originally
understood the Equal Protection Clause to be intentionally vague, thus
deferring the development of a specific definition to future generations.409
Because both the text and original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause
are vague, the Court must give meaning to equal protection through judicially
crafted principles.410 In doing so, foreign law can be a helpful source of
persuasive authority.411
The second basis of opposition to foreign law is a fear of opportunism.
Because there are so many jurisdictions around the world, a U.S. judge can
probably find some support somewhere in the world for any position that the
judge wants to adopt.412 As a result, some skeptics fear judges citing foreign
law opportunistically, without any rhyme or reason other than to support their
preferred positions. This logic, however, presupposes that all foreign
jurisdictions are equal and that choosing among them really is arbitrary. To
the contrary, this Article selected jurisdictions to study based on their status

406. See generally Bork, Whose Constitution, supra note 351; Hoover, supra note 405
(discussing Justice Scalia’s claims regarding originalism).
407. See, e.g., Fontana, supra note 354, at 579 (“According to either contemporary version
of constitutional originalism, the evidence from the Founding seems to support the
contemporary usage of comparative materials by judges.”); David C. Gray, Why Justice Scalia
Should Be a Constitutional Comparativist . . . Sometimes, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1251 (2007)
(contending that “originalists must take into account contemporary views, foreign and
domestic, in a limited set of cases where the meaning of the Constitution’s universalist
language is at stake.”).
408. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 427, 456–57 (2007) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause was
understood by its contemporaries to be intentionally vague); Thomas B. Colby, The Federal
Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 593
(2008) (same). But see Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and
Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 247–48, 251 (1997) (contending that the Clause’s
framers intended to prohibit laws that “single out any person or group of persons for special
benefits or burdens without an adequate ‘public purpose’ justification” and that this intent
should inform constitutional interpretation).
409. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 408, at 456–57; Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of
Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1253–54 (1997).
410. Cf. Holning Lau, Pluralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L L.
REV. 317, 346–47 (2007) (providing examples of the Supreme Court’s history of using
judicially crafted principles to give meaning to vague constitutional provisions).
411. See Levinson, supra note 29, at 353 (drawing a distinction between foreign law as
persuasive authority and binding authority).
412. Chief Justice Roberts exhibited this worry when, as a Supreme Court nominee, he
said, “looking at foreign law for support is like looking out over a crowd and picking out your
friends.” Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better than Knowing More? Unpacking the
Controversy over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1276
(2006).
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as peer jurisdictions from various parts of the world.413 This status renders
these jurisdictions particularly persuasive.414 Instead of starting with a
preferred domestic outcome and looking abroad for support, our method was
to first identify peer jurisdictions worth examining and then see what we
might learn from their experiences.415 Judges can take the same approach,
assuaging concerns that citation of foreign law is an opportunistic endeavor.
The third critique of citing foreign law is based on the belief that the U.S.
constitutional law is culturally specific to the United States and, therefore,
drawing inspiration from foreign sources of law is inappropriate.416 This
critique is, however, weak with respect to the equal protection issues we have
discussed. As David Fontana suggested, comparative analysis should not
raise concerns about U.S. particularism when the analysis “does not use
comparative constitutional law in such a radical way as to displace the
centrality of American sources.”417 This Article has advocated an approach
that preserves the centrality of U.S. law. We started by tracing the
development of U.S. equal protection doctrine. We then looked abroad to
help us reflect on the current posture of U.S. doctrine. We argued that foreign
developments could play a confirmatory role in advancing U.S. doctrine
along its current paths. We also acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court
may well reject doctrinal experiments from our foreign peers. In sum, this
Article has advocated a “refined comparativism” that is not at odds with U.S.
cultural particularism.
CONCLUSION
This Article has revealed and synthesized three emerging trajectories in
the U.S. Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. First, the Court
has taken a few initial steps toward blurring the line between cases of facial
discrimination and cases of disparate impact. Second, the Court has begun
to collapse tiered review of discrimination based on personal characteristics.
These two trajectories combine to produce a third trajectory: the growing
convergence between U.S. equal protection doctrine and equality
jurisprudence from abroad. The collective wisdom of foreign jurisdictions
should encourage the United States to continue along its current trajectories

413. See supra notes 224–30 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 379–87 and accompanying text; see also Rex D. Glensy, QuasiGlobal Social Norms, 38 CONN. L. REV. 79, 107 (2005) (“[T]he sources of persuasive authority
on which U.S. courts will rely will not come from all nations, nor should they. . . . [T]his
country need only concern itself with . . . societies [that] are based on a fundamental respect
for human rights.” (footnote omitted)); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons:
Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 125 (2005) (“[P]ractices of
countries with commitments to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law roughly
comparable to ours are likely to have more positive persuasive value . . . .”); Holning Lau,
Sexual Orientation & Gender Identity: American Law in Light of East Asian Developments,
31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 70–71 (2007) (explaining that jurisdictions are particularly
persuasive if they are “at once ideologically similar and culturally different”).
415. See supra notes 224–30 and accompanying text.
416. See Fontana, supra note 354, at 615–16.
417. Id. at 616.
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of doctrinal reform. In devising a legal standard to replace tiered review, the
United States could learn from various approaches adopted by foreign courts.
The Court’s decision whether to continue bridging the impact-treatment
divide and collapsing tiered review will impact many areas of ongoing
controversy. For example, these doctrinal trajectories should impact
litigation challenging North Carolina’s moratorium on local governments
enacting antidiscrimination ordinances.418 They should influence the ways
we view the discriminatory impact of pending “bathroom bills.”419 Doctrinal
reform should influence ongoing equal protection challenges to affirmative
action programs.420 In addition, doctrinal reform may influence equal
protection challenges to President Trump’s bans on immigration and
travel.421
At the outset, we noted that constitutional doctrine changes slowly and we
acknowledged that the doctrinal trajectories we discussed are still in early
stages of development.422 Whether the United States continues along the
trajectories we traced may depend on the future composition of the Court.
Justice Gorsuch recently filled the seat of the late Justice Antonin Scalia.423
This change might not substantially alter the trajectory of equal protection
doctrine because Justice Scalia was not in the majority in most of the cases
that constitute the trend lines that we traced.424 Thus, the previous majorities
are likely to remain intact.

418. See supra notes 13–15, 115–19 and accompanying text.
419. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
420. See Robert Barnes, Plan to Shield Illegal Immigrants Suffers Loss: Justices Deliver
Surprising Boost to Backers of Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, June 24, 2016, at A1
(discussing the impact of Fisher II on pending lawsuits challenging affirmative action
programs at Harvard University and the University of North Carolina).
421. President Trump’s initial immigration order banned travel and refugee admission from
seven predominantly Muslim countries. Exec. Order. No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1,
2017). Opponents of the ban claimed it violated equal protection (among other constitutional
protections) by discriminating based on religion, even though the policy was facially neutral
with respect to religion. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2017)
(describing equal protection claim against the travel ban in a case that was later rendered
moot). As we were writing this Article, President Trump replaced his initial ban with newer
iterations of the ban. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017); Presidential
Proclamation, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry
into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (Sept. 24, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2017/09/24/enhancing-vetting-capabilities-andprocesses-detecting-attemptedentry [https://perma.cc/R678-KL5F]. The ACLU and other
advocates have announced their intention to file new litigation to challenge President Trump’s
most recent ban. See Matt Zapotosky, ACLU and Others to Challenge Latest Trump Ban in
Court, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/aclu-and-others-to-challenge-latest-trump-travel-ban-in-court/2017/09/29/8124a3fea556-11e7-8cfe-d5b912fabc99_story.html [https://perma.cc/9UBW-GR7E].
422. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
423. Adam Liptak & Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as Supreme
Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/
neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/8CMM-XYKR].
424. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2198 (2016)
(majority opinion); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Fisher II was decided after Justice Scalia’s death. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2198.
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If, however, any of the three eldest Justices on the Court—Justices
Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Breyer—retire in the near future, that would give
President Trump an opportunity to replace them with a Justice similar to
Justice Scalia.425 This could potentially reverse the doctrinal trajectories that
we discussed. For example, Justice Scalia has adamantly called for
adherence to rigid tiers of scrutiny.426 If multiple new Justices adopt that
position, the collapse of tiered review may be halted. While tectonic shifts
in the Court’s composition are possible in the future, Justice Gorsuch’s new
position alone will not dramatically shift the Court’s dynamics. Barring such
a dramatic shift, this Article seeks to provide judges, advocates, and
commentators with a clearer view of the doctrinal reforms that are already
underway, such that those reforms can be extended in future cases in the spirit
of common law constitutionalism.

425. David Morris, The Next President Will Likely Appoint 4 Supreme Court Justices: Who
Do You Want Picking Them?, SLATE (July 29, 2016), http://www.salon.com/2016/07/29/
the_next_president_will_likely_appoint_4_supreme_court_Justices_who_do_you_want_pic
king_them_partner/ [https://perma.cc/U86C-CCEL] (speculating that Justices Ginsburg,
Kennedy, and Breyer will soon retire).
426. See Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2697 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

